DND downplays operational impact of Open Skies restrictions by Russia, contrasting the DoD

(U) Canadian and American airmen load wet film in an observation camera
 Photo by Public Affairs Photographer Warrant Officer Robert Granger,
Director General Public Affairs, Ottawa. (IS2007-6013)

Exercising their Open Skies Treaty right, the Russian Federation performed overflights of Eastern Canada at the end of August 2016. The Treaty on Open Skies is a transparency / arms control and verification agreement between 34 countries, which Canada and Russia are signatory to.  Since there was no press release put out by the Department of National Defence about the overflight, I requested an interview to discuss the recent overflight, and other Open Skies topics, with a representative of the Department of National Defence.  Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette, Section Head of Strategic Joint Staff, Arms Control and Verification 4, agreed to meet and speak with me, on the record.

As background to this, you may recall the testimony before congress of Admiral Cecil Haney (Commander, U.S. Strategic Command) February 24th 2016 at the meeting of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Strategic Forces Posture, if not here it is. You may remember Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart (Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency) speaking at the March 2nd 2016 House Armed Services Committee hearing on World Wide Threats; if not, here it is.  You may remember Mr. Brian P. Mckeon (Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense) speaking at the April 14th 2016 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Missile Defeat Posture and Strategy of the United States; if not, here it is.  To sum up, they all spoke rather negatively about Russia and the Open Skies Treaty, painting the Russians as abusing the spirit of the agreement and using it to conduct "foundational intelligence", as well as slamming the Russians' plans to upgrade to an "electro-optical sensor" from wet film.  Perhaps you recall their depiction of the restrictions to Open Skies flights over Russia, phrased to suggest the flights were blocked, when they were not.  Perhaps you remember that Russia was being accused of being in contravention of the treaty.  Then there was the 2016 United States Department of State Compliance Report (here) that outlined what were supposed to be major violations of the treaty in 2015.  There were threats of retaliation, described at length by the House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce, Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes and Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry in a letter to President Obama here.

The Russians came back to Canada for their most recent overflight, with the newly painted, and digital electro-optical sensor-outfitted, Russian Federation Open Skies-approved Tupolev Tu-154M RF-85655.  It was the first Canadian overflight by the Russians to use their new electro-optical sensor, approved by the OSCC in June 2016.  One week prior, the Russians performed an overflight of the United States, with the same digital electro-optical sensor, despite the objections raised in the spring before the congress and threats from congressmen.  Regarding what some call "advanced sensors" used on the Russian open Skies missions, Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette did not use US Lt.Gen Stewart's "Polaroid vs 1080P" comparison, voiced on March 2nd 2016 before the House Armed Services Committee hearing on World Wide Threats. Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette stated:

"30cm resolution for digital, 30cm for wet film; it's like, what's heavier? 5 pounds of iron or 5 pounds of (lead)? 30cm is 30cm." 

The Lieutenant-Colonel, in stark contrast with US officials, is clearly not worried about the new digital electro-optical sensors, which were framed as "advanced sensors" by the American media, fueled by US Government officials' statements.  Before being approved, the sensors were vetted by a multi-national team representing the nations of the OSCC; 30cm resolution is the treaty-mandated imagery resolution limit, both digital and wet film cameras must adhere to the same standards in order to be used on board an Open Skies plane.  There is no significant intelligence advantage that is provided by digital cameras, other than post processing of the original image, removing the need to process hundreds of wet film images and create print duplicates.  Changing the type of sensor from analog to digital is akin to a professional photographer switching from using a 35mm DSLR camera to a digital DSLR camera, assuming both gave the same resolution image.

When asked about Russian restrictions on the Open Skies Treaty overflights over the Russian Federation, and if they impacted the observation missions the RCAF routinely flies over the Russian Federation in those same restricted areas, Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette stated ...

". . . somewhat, but at the end I don't think the treaty is degraded by any shape or form . . . operationally it makes things a little bit more complicated, but not totally (insurmountable), there's always a way."  

Specifically on the topic of the flight distance restriction of 500km imposed over Kaliningrad:

"If I cannot see everything in 500km it doesn't mean I cannot go a 2nd time and do another 500km, if I wanted to do 1000km there; so in the end, is it degraded? Somewhat, because I would rather do it once."

...which, again, is a far cry from the Pentagon / DoD narrative which depicted the Russian-imposed restrictions as being heinous acts, stopping just short of suggesting the United States should pull out of treaty because of them.

United States Marine Corps Lieutenant general Lt. Gen. Stewart, the Director of the US Defence Information Agency, accused the Russians of spying on critical infrastructure and gathering "foundational intelligence"; suggesting that some sites being photographed in the United States by the Russians aren't military in nature, and taking observation photos of them is taking advantage of the treaty for espionage purposes.  I asked RCAF Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette about Russian Open Skies overflights taking aerial photography of infrastructure, power facilities, and other areas of seemingly questionable military value in Canada:

"people have the misconception because we're flying (a) military airplane to do those missions, that (we) are solely looking at military resources . . . every country who flies Open Skies is not solely flying over (military sites)."

Many non-military sites are valuable intelligence targets that would indicate an imminent threat to Russia; rail yards, transportation hubs, factories, power stations... all have military value, and if Canada was preparing for war, they would each show changes.  Green vehicles being moved by rail.  Machines of war being produced at domestic facilities.  Fighter jets being lined up at alternate airfields.  It isn't sufficient to just look at military bases, and Canada doesn't limit our Open Skies Treaty overflights to purely military targets in Russia either. (more here)

I was very pleased to have the opportunity to speak with Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette, and hope I will be able to do so again.  As the Section Head of SJS ACV 4, the unit which performs the Open Skies overflights by Canada, facilitates Russian overflights of Canada, and facilitates transit of Russian Open Skies missions en-route to the United States, his in-depth insight and experience clarified several topics of interest.

Russian Open Skies Treaty overflight of the USA | September 26th-30th 2016

Nevada Test Site - Gate 1
Taken April 2 2010 - Photo by Bill Ebbesen (Wikipedia)

While I don't intend to blog about every single Open Skies Treaty overflight of the United States of America by the Russian Air Force, Nevada is a hub of historically significant military sites, and continues to be a hotbed of military testing facilities, restricted airspace, and military bases. Generally, the Russian Air Force doesn't pick the places they photograph; they are the operators and tip of the spear;.  The RuAF execute requests by other agencies for imagery of American locations of interest, not just requests from the Russian Ministry of Defence. Since each Open Skies mission has a limited amount of distance it can cover, as mandated by the Treaty, the Russians do not try and fly over all of the US at once, they break it up into zones. This flight was an observation mission over California and Nevada. If you zoom in to a reasonable detail level and follow the flight path you'll find a "who's who" (a what's what?) of DoD and DoE locations, as well as other places of interest to the Russian Federation.  Reverse-engineering this flight path, you can discern where the US Military is conducting their most sensitive testing, training, research, and any number of other "interesting" things.

Previous Open Skies treaty posts here for background.

Thank you @ktul_adsb for spotting additional points of interest!

NB: RF-85655 just took off en route to CFB Trenton, Iceland, and ultimately Kubinka (Кубинка) Air Base, originating from Travis AFB where last week's mission was being based from.

Tracking Russian Open Skies Tu-154M / Tu-214ON Aircraft

Photo by Mark Beal (@veryboeing) during RF-85655's stop-over in Halifax, Nova Scotia on 2016-09-01

While American Open Skies flights have been using the same planes since the Treaty on Open Skies (Open Skies Treaty) came into force in 2002, the Russian Federation are phasing in a new pair of Tupolev Tu-214ON planes.  The Tupolev Tu-154M is still being used for Canadian / US / Danish overflights, and I am not sure how long it will be before the Tu-214ON takes over.

Tupolev Tu-154M/LK-1
Reg: RA-85655
C/N 89A798
ICAO 194E97 (154E97?)

Tupolev Tu-214ON
Reg: RA-64519
C/N 42709019
ICAO 14FC07

Reg: RA-64525
C/N 41003025
ICAO 14FC0D

It seems like only RA-64525 can be found on adsbexchange.com, and neither of the new planes can be found on flightradar24.com.  Hopefully they fix that soon!

Tracking American Open Skies OC-135B/W Aircraft

"An OC-135B aircraft sits on an airfield at Ulan-Ude, Russia prior to an Open Skies flight.
DTRA conducts inspection flights with the U.S. Air Force in accordance with the Open Skies treaty."
(DTRA photo - March 3, 2009) Flickr

The United States operates two Open Skies Treaty-approved planes designed to perform observation missions over Russia, or other countries.  The aircraft are based out of Offutt AFB for ops, training and maintenance, and function as part of the 55th Wing, 45th Reconnaissance Squadron (per Wikipedia).

The United States Air Force does not publish press releases, or mention to the media, when they perform Open Skies Treaty overflights; to keep track of the flights using OSINT, adsbexchange.com and flightradar24.com can be leveraged.  

Using Google, the tail numbers became clear  (Registration / ICAO):

Boeing OC-135B Open Skies (61-2670 / AE08D5)
Boeing OC-135W Open Skies (61-2672 / AE08D6)

While the transponder beaconing from 61-2670 broadcasts that it is a Boeing OC-135B, 61-2672 reports itself as an OC-135W.  Contradictory information online suggests both planes are of the OC-135W variety, but I can't find the differences between one and the other.  It could be a cosmetic difference, I'm unclear what the difference in designation would be between the OC-135B and OC-135W.  Regardless, if you sign up for an account on FlightRadar24.com you can program an alert to be emailed to you when the flights are detected by one of their global network of receivers.

If you want to look at historical flight information, adsbechange.com may be more useful for that task (and free!).

Here is a direct link to a dynamic report containing the most recent OC-135B/W flights (it takes a while to load, hang tight)

Callsigns

There is some confusion about the callsigns that are used, and it comes from the historical report mentioned above.  It seems that when an Open Skies overflight mission is underway, the callsign used, for either airframe, is OSY12F (does F stand for overFlight?), and when the plane is in transit the callsign is OSY12T (does this indicate "in Transit"?).  

The two planes also use other callsigns; and I'm not sure what they are otherwise commonly used for, if they are indicative of any specific operations that are not Open Skies related.  

From October 13th 2015 and September 17th 2016 I noticed the following callsigns being used by 61-2670 and 61-2672, as documented on adsbexchange.com

COBRA12
COBRA23
COBRA24
COBRA32
COBRA35
COBRA43
COBRA44
COBRA45
COBRA46
COBRA52
COBRA53
COBRA55
COBRA70
COBRA72
SABRE35
TORA82
TRUBS72

...suggestions as to what operations these callsigns might be indicative of, or confirmation they mean nothing at all, would be welcome!  ( Some callsigns have been noted previously from 55 Wing / 45 Recon here and here, but do not indicate if they suggest a specific function (training/deployed ops/etc) )

Open Skies Treaty overflight; Russia over Canada 2016

Russian Federation Open Skies Plane
Tupolev Tu-154M LK1
Registration: RA-85655
Mode-S Code: 194E97
Serial Number (MSN): 89A798



Photo by Mark Beal (@veryboeing)
during RF-85655's stop-over in
Halifax, Nova Scotia on 2016-09-01








The Russian Federation held their yearly Canadian Open Skies Treaty mission this past week, arriving at CFB Trenton from Washington DC, on the heels of their previous Open Skies Treaty mission in the United States.  The Russians landed at CFB Trenton on August 27th ~1830Z, and departed for Russia on September 3rd ~1900Z.

Since the treaty came into force in 2002, states who are signatory to the Treaty on Open Skies (also known as the Open Skies Treaty) can conduct a treaty-defined maximum number of yearly overflights of other signatory nations, with a maximum flight distance dependant from where they are taking off from in that country, and only certain airports in signatory nations are approved for these observation planes to land.  Not all countries have approved planes; with approved sensors, or approved cameras.  Those that don't piggy-back on the flights of other signatory states.  The purpose of these flights is to take pictures of the other signatory members' military and industrial facilities to build confidence that the "other side" isn't amassing troops or tanks on the border, out of conventional view, or hiding from satellite imagery, but located perhaps where a closer-to-the-ground plane would be able to photograph them.  The overflights are conducted at a height and speed that allows for 30cm resolution imagery, which is slightly less detailed than publicly available commercial satellite imagery today.  There are 34 states who are party to the agreement today, including Canada, the United States, and the Russian Federation.  My previous posts about the Open Skies Treaty are here.

Several people have asked why this visit by the Russian Air Force is important, or news-worthy; this is a treaty that has been in place since 2002, and overflights happen routinely.  It's a good question with a complicated answer.  Most importantly to me; most Canadians don't know a level of cooperation exists with the Russian Federation that would allow them to overfly Canada and take pictures of anything they want, anywhere, coast to coast to coast.  Most Canadians don't know that Canada does the same over Russia, flying over their territory more than once a year, and photographing anything, anywhere.  Right now, perhaps more than ever, the rhetoric out of some factions of world governments would like to vilify the Russian or American governments as evil empires intent on world domination.  Leveraging the imagery attained from Open Skies overflights can diffuse some of those wild rumours.  Treaties like the Open Skies Treaty show that world powers can actually work together and cooperate. Treaties work when they are negotiated in good faith, and applied in good faith.  The Open Skies Treaty is, in my opinion, a poster child for successful treaties and diplomatic negotiation, despite minor issues in its application over Russian Federation territory.  Interestingly, while the treaty and overflights are not highly classified endeavours, neither the American or Canadian governments publish press releases about them when they occur, but will answer questions when asked.  Russian media (TASS, Sputnik, etc) publish the flight is going to take place right before it happens; this is true for flights over Russia, or flights being conducted by Russia over other countries.

While the Russians could visit Canada more often (per the treaty), the past twelve years of flights show the Russians come to Canada about once a year to overfly Canadian military and industrial facilities.  Using FlightRadar24.com, the route the Open Skies flight was taking was documented during the flight, and posted to Google Maps, prior to requesting the official mission plan from the Department of National Defence via Access to Information.  The "catch" regarding using the freely available FlightRadar24.com data was, the route had to be in range of civilian transponder receivers to allow MLAT triangulation to work.  Military planes do not always broadcast their position by ADS-B transponder, so triangulation of their location is necessary.

Unfortunately only half of the flight was caught in this manner, likely due to the northerly points they were travelling to, and how far away they were from civilian receivers and plane spotter enthusiasts.  The rest of the data points will hopefully become available over the next several months.

From the flight path and previous visits educated guesses about what they were taking pictures of can be made.  We know the Russian overflights take pictures of both current military facilities, and decommissioned facilities; I presume to make sure they were shut down, and stay shut down.  The below map has been marked with likely targets of their Open Skies Treaty sanctioned IMINT mission.

Embiggen the map by clicking the square at the top right of the embedded map below

Map of RuAF flight, locations likely photographed, and all Treasury Board locations (except the 3 Northernmost)

After leaving Canada, RF-85655 refuelled in Iceland on its way back to the Russian Federation, first landing at Kubinka (Кубинка), where I speculate some of the flight crew disembarked, then on to  Chkalovsky (Чкаловский) where I (again) speculate the plane will undergo maintenance.  Kubinka (Кубинка) is where previous film developing has taken place, and I assume if the film was being processed there, a lodger reconnaissance unit is stationed there as well.  Since the cameras onboard the flight are now digital, no film processing will be needed, but I theorize the unit is located in the same place where they previously processed film, so the crew who were manning the sensors aboard the flight potentially disembarked there.  Kubinka (Кубинка) is also where other states' Open Skies missions start from, when nations arrive to overfly the Russian Federation under the Open Skies Treaty.

I will hopefully have a significant update to this story later in the month.