Open Skies Treaty overflight of the United States by the RuAF Sept 25-29 2017

From September 25th to 29th the USAF played host to an Open Skies Treaty overflight of the United States by the Russian Federation.  Here is the flight plan as captured by FlightRadar24, as best as it was able to track the flight using Mode-S MLAT, triangulating transponder information received by private receivers across the country. You'll notice the green dots are likely sites which pictures were being taken, as they were within the allowable envelope. Provided they were at ~11,000ft, and not banking, they would be allowed take pictures, per the treaty and arranged flight plan.

Flying at 11,000ft indicates the digital electro-optical sensor (that when spoken of before the Senate Armed Services Committee was made to sound like the Death Star by DIA 3-Star General Stewart) was in "medium" altitude mode, and the swath was 7.7km (4.8mi) total width.  Please remember that USAF members are aboard the plane for the entire overflight, the camera being used has been certified by a 22 nation committee, and the resolution of the imagery is worse than commercially available satellite imagery.

As usual, the USAF did not inform the American people of this overflight because their media posture is "passive", by policy. Only the Russian news media, usually maligned as "fake news" or propagandists, inform us of these flights. Why would the US Government be more controlling with the message than the Russians? Wouldn't they want to show a working treaty in action and dispel any fear about the Red Scare narrative? 🤔

(There is another Open Skies overflight going on this week, FYI)

Russian Open Skies Treaty overflight of the USA, August 2017 edition

Refer to previous posts I've written on the Open Skies Treaty for background; this post is just to get you the map with all the flight information available from FlightRadar24.

While elements of the media have been focused on the "outrage" of the "low-level" flight over the Pentagon, Camp David, and Trump's golf course, I've been laughing at the other obvious targets of their photography; including one of my favourite military targets; Site R.  Several military bases, Navy facilities, Shipyards, Ammunition Depots, etc.. were photographed as well.  Their altitude (~4000ft) suggests a digital panoramic camera is being used, but I don't have confirmation of that. The treaty mandates a maximum of 30cm resolution, which is less detailed than commercial satellite imagery, but the camera is certified as being tamper-proof, and the imagery can (is) shared among all 34+ signatories of the treaty.

Anyone telling you the Russians are using the Open Skies Treaty for purposes it wasn't intended to be used for has not read the treaty, or has ulterior motives.  Don't believe the hype, look for yourself.  Zoom in on the map below, look up your favourite East Coast military facilities.  A reminder tho; military targets are not always military buildings or property.  Tanks could be sitting in a rail yard, and could be just as valuable to check out year to year. General Dynamics or other defense contractors might be performing tests at a civilian owned property.  Some very poorly informed people have even suggested the treaty has something to do with missiles. It does not. The treaty covers everything and anything they want it to cover; and that's how it works for our overflights of Russia as well.

Unfortunately, the "new" low altitude (by comparison w/ former ~10,000ft) flights makes it hard to triangulate the transponder using MLAT, so the flight route is spotty.  Many of the targets are quite obvious.  Also of note, the "swath" that the camera catches in the frame is large; I'm not sure how large with that camera at 4,000ft, but they do not need to be "over" something to get a good picture of it.

A Journalist's Primer on the Open Skies Treaty

You're a journalist. Your editor just told you you have to write something on the Treaty on Open Skies, or the Open Skies Treaty, because someone in Washington made a statement about it, and they said it had to do with Russia. Everyone loves reading about Russia; am I right?.  Unfortunately, you can't find a whole lot out there from primary sources, and the US Government is giving you the run-around. All you have to go on is whatever statement the politician you're covering made. Were they telling the truth? Can you fact check what they said?  How do you do so, if nobody's talking, or even knows anything about this damn treaty?

Excerpts from US Air Force manual 16-604 dated 2016-05-31 titled
"IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND COMPLIANCE WITH,
THE TREATY ON OPEN SKIES"

Well let me help you.

Who the hell are you?

I'm a guy who's interested, who's been following this treaty for years, who's had the opportunity to talk to some very well versed people, both on and off the record.  I want to give journalists the ability to critically-think their way around whatever it is they're covering regarding the Open Skies Treaty, provide primary source information to them, and give some suggestions on who else to ask questions to; who will answer intelligently, with experience and knowledge.  Taking a government source and prefixing the statement with "a Senior Government Official said..." is not good enough to absolve a story from the responsibility of the written word.

Why?
I noticed that Journalists are at a disadvantage on the Open Skies Treaty, more so than many topics.  There is very little information out there that can be consulted for background information and research; that's not an accident. I'm concerned that journalists will not find the objective answers they're looking for while researching the story, and will inadvertently present a one-sided story directly influenced by political actors that want to control the message. Experts in the State Department Arms Control and Verification department are not at liberty to reach out to the press and inform them how well everything is working, in many ways.  US Air Force manual 16-604 dated 2016-05-31 titled "IMPLEMENTATION OF, AND COMPLIANCE WITH, THE TREATY ON OPEN SKIES" quite clearly states the US Air Force will not publicise the flights, but will answer questions from the media is asked through their Public Affairs department. Well, the catch there is, if a Russian plane is flying over the United States, how would the media know, if the US Air Force won't tell you? Welcome to Twitter; where wonks like myself are keeping an eye out and will Tweet about the #OpenSkiesTreaty flight when we find out about it.

So what does all that mean? I think this means that you're going to need to pull information out of the US Government, and they're not going to want to provide you anything. It will be like pulling teeth.

In researching the Open Skies Treaty you probably discovered was the Treaty on Open Skies, or Open Skies Treaty, has the same name as some commercial multinational aviation trade agreements, also known by the name Open Skies. These have nothing to do with each other, and unfortunately it's hard to tell them apart with Google.

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Pro Tip:

When searching for something to do with the Open Skies Treaty, try the following search terms.

open skies treaty russia

Chances are, all references to the treaty on the internet will include the word "Russia".

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The Open Skies Treaty is not a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia. You don't need to limit yourself to talking to just the Americans, or just the Russians. It is a 34-way multinational treaty between the following countries; all of the countries have equal say, and are affected by anything the United States or Russia arbitrarily does. I suspect many would be more than happy to unload on you if you asked them.

Belarus	The French Republic	Kingdom of the Netherlands	Turkey
Belgium	The Republic of Georgia	Norway	Ukraine
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Germany	Poland	The United Kingdom
Bulgaria	Greece	Portugal	The United States
Canada	Hungary	Romania
Croatia	Iceland	The Russian Federation
The Czech Republic	Italy	Slovakia
Denmark	Latvia	Slovenia
Estonia	Lithuania	Spain
Finland	Luxembourg	Sweden

Each of these countries has at least two government departments with rolls to play regarding the treaty, the US has three. 

Each has an analogue to Global Affairs Canada or the United States Department of State, which manage the treaty at a diplomatic-level.
Each has an analogue to the Royal Canadian Air Force or United States Air Force, who implement the treaty on an operational-level.

I do not understand how the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) fits in with the other two, but they are also pivotal in the execution of Open Skies Treaty missions over the USA and Russia.

If you are a correspondant outside the US, or have contacts outside the US, why not discuss the Open Skies Treaty with other national Foreign Affairs departments. I've never heard an interview with the Italians, the French, the Spanish.. well, any other countries regarding their Open Skies Treaty opinions. Being a 34+ nation treaty, it can afford more interesting interview opportunities than a simple bilateral agreement, like the old SALT or START agreements. Do you think 34 nations' representatives could synchronize their stories before speaking to the cameras, if the media were asking questions and on the ball? I bet the head of the Slovenian delegation to the OSCC would have some interesting things to say about the American Open Skies policies; if only they were asked!


You might not realize that the people flying these missions, don't actually know what they're photographing.  The Royal Canadian Air Force is given direction to perform overflights of Russia, but they are only given coordinates of the targets for their observation mission. While military intelligence might be giving them part of the list of targets to photograph, other branches of the Canadian government could be asking for the information and proving their own list of sites they would like photographed. While the crews of the Open Skies Treaty plane performing the overflight might have a good idea of what they're taking pictures of, sometimes it's less obvious. If you want to know how the treaty is really operating, you want to talk to the Air Force personnel who are doing it.

If you want to know how negotiations and amendments to the treaty are going, at the latest meeting in Geneva, you want to talk to Global Affairs Canada, the State Department, or your favourite national equivalent. They are the diplomatic interface that makes the treaty work, and while they do talk to those who are actually performing the flights and executing the missions, they are the bean counters, not the boots on the ground (er, boots in the air?).

The Open Skies Treaty is the brainchild of Dwight Eisenhower in 1955, but it was only resurrected and signed much later, in 1992, by George H.W. Bush, and came into force in 2002.







Unlike a topic like cancelling people's health coverage, which can get people quite animated, there will be no outcry over the Open Skies Treaty, because people don't know what it is, that it's in place, and flights have been happening since 2002. Russians have been conducting flights over the US, almost monthly, for 15 years, and it's still "news" to people each time it makes headlines.  This is, of course, partially due to the lack of publicity out of the US Government.  Also, as I told Royal Canadian Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette, Section Head of Strategic Joint Staff, Arms Control and Verification 4, arms control is not sexy.  Without some sort of sizzler or scandal, I think it's been hard to get the media and public attention arms control treaties deserve.  I hope that's about to change. 

If you're researching a story about an American official, politician or appointee, disparaging the Open Skies Treaty; shouldn't there be 33 other voices agreeing with him? Issuing press releases?

Maybe, as a journalist who's looking for confirmation of a statement from the current administration, you'd like to interview a former head of the State Department who might contradict today's message?  Yes, that's an excellent idea.  Hillary Clinton, you may have heard of her, was a big fan of the Open Skies treaty, and a huge supporter of going digital and away from the wet film cameras that are presently used by all countries, except Russia.  Yes, Russia built, from scratch, a digital camera that adheres to all the resolution limits and stipulations in the Open Skies Treaty, and has it deployed already; which has upset the United States Defence Intelligence Agency greatly, mostly because they were shown to be wrong and politically motivated in their objections to going digital. But what about the US digital camera initiatives?  Well; budget cut-backs. You know how it is.  I'm quite sure Hillary Clinton would love to do an interview about the Open Skies Treaty and the proposed, but never implemented, US digital upgrade.  Just don't ask her about the emails, she's still touchy about the emails.

Perhaps Rose Gottemoeller, now the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, who worked with the State Department Arms Control and Compliance group from 2009 to 2016 as the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, and then as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, would be willing to give a statement.  Although outside of her current duties, with which she is no doubt very busy, she might give a good quote.

Diana Marvin, a former senior member of the State Department Arms Control department, might have time to make a statement from her previous experience from the Obama, Bush, and Clinton years.

I'm really baffled how a treaty, proposed by the US, that promotes openness, has been perverted by the US Government into a collection of secret overflights; maybe it's 1950s paranoia that was just carried forward without much thought. Distrust of their own citizen perhaps? I really don't know. I do know that the secrecy around it provokes fear in paranoid Americans and fuels unhealthy conspiracy theories.  Can we please end the secrecy and report on these overflights as the successful multi-national treaty implementation that it is, and has been, for many years?

"Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." (1914)

-Louis Brandeis, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (1916-1939)

Two Russian Open Skies Treaty aerial observation missions over the USA in June 2017

If you're unfamiliar with the Open Skies Treaty, I've written quite a bit about it before, and I highly recommend leafing through the old blog posts to get up to speed.

What you're about to read is coverage that no news organisation (that I'm aware of) is providing you, because USAF policy is to not talk about Open Skies Treaty observation flights.  Yes, like Fight Club. Since no press releases are put out by the USAF, no US media cover the flights, because they don't know what to say, and all the USAF personnel who could say something, are not allowed to per USAF policy.  Page 30, Section 4.2.1.1.4.7, Air Force Manual 16-604 (2009) "posture for OST flights is “passive.” (we) respond to inquiries, but (don't) promote activities" while that does not specifically state that USAF personnel are not allowed to talk about it, the information is classified (a low-level classification) and the treaty is obscure.  If the US Media were trying to confirm when a flight was happening, IF it was happening, their first source would be TASS or Sputnik, which would immediately raise red flags to Western Media editors. After all, why believe these agents of disinformation and Russian propaganda?  Well, maybe because they're the only people who publicise the treaty overflights; of the US over Russia, or Russia over other countries.  Why is it that only Russia tells their people about a 34+ nation treaty that's working extremely well? Why doesn't the US government want their citizens to know they exercise their treaty rights to overfly Russia, and Russia does the same to the USA, on an almost monthly basis?

I don't know. It's a complete mystery to me.

The Russian Federation performed two scheduled aerial observation missions over the United States under the terms agreed upon by the 34-35 nations in the Treaty on Open Skies, or Open Skies Treaty as it is commonly referred to, between June 19th and June 30th, 2017. Per treaty rules, they left, stopped at CFB Trenton, and went back in between overflights.

June 19 - June 23, 2017

The Russian team flew in to Travis AFB, on their Treaty-approved Tupolev Tu-154M, and recently outfitted digital camera, from Moscow, on Monday, and likely negotiated the flight plan they proposed on Tuesday morning with the American team. The US team is assigned to escort them in their observation plane and ensure all restrictions of the overflight are adhered to; heights are as promised, courses are adhered to, etc. From Tuesday to Thursday (Thursday is when the observation flights started) the US military and defence industry would have been alerted, and would likely have been covering up/moving any equipment they did not want photographed that was along the flight path.  This is standard procedure, and known to be a cat and mouse game.  Anything too big to move will simply be photographed, but these flights, while short notice, can be anticipated to a certain extent. They are routine, happen half a dozen times a year, and I don't think any out-in-the-open testing is ever performed without consideration regarding it being photographed by satellites or the Open Skies Treaty overflights.  After all, the Russian Federation (and the Chinese) also have satellites which can (at least) see the visual spectrum, and may also be outfitted with space-borne Synthetic Aperture Radar. After a brief tour of California, the Russian team (with their American handlers aboard) went to Alaska.  Unfortunately, FlightRadar24 and ADSBExchange have terrible coverage up there, and little of the flight was captured by transponder.  From what I gather that may or may not have overflown several air force bases including missile launch facilities.

June 26 - June 30, 2017

The second week's flights took place first over Texas at a low altitude (5000ft), then after a brief stop to uncover the belly mounted framing camera, continued at a higher altitude. On Friday they finished off the New Mexico leg of the trip, overflying many famous historical nuclear test, development, and production facilities.



But what did they take pictures of?  Well, that's an excellent question. I don't know, but I can make some educated guesses, and you can too,  if you follow along:

• Open Skies Treaty flights are based on a negotiation of a flight plan that is proposed by the overflying party. The observed party can argue or debate which route to the locations might be best, if poor weather is expected, or if cloud cover will hamper the trip, they can propose alternate routes or sites. Ultimately, the overflying party can refuse the options and insist on the flight plan they want, and if the overflown party objects, they need to cancel the whole trip, with causses a major international incident.  But, there are some things that are constant on these flight plans (from studying past flight plans); steady speed and constant height are tell-tale signs of photos being taken. When the flight plan is agreed to, there are legs, and for each leg an altitude is selected which will place the camera at the correct distance from the ground to get 30cm imagery.  Same with speed; they want the speed of the aircraft to be consistant. Usually the height is between 8000-12000ft and the speed between 300-350kts.  On the maps I've marked potential sites in the right speed envelope in green (based on my best estimate). If the plane is doing 500kts, they aren't taking pictures. If they're at 34,000ft, they aren't taking pictures either. If they're at 8,000ft, and doing 300kts, you can bet they're taking pictures, or are lining up for the shot.
• American military or defence installations are sometimes pretty easy to spot along the line, especially if they're extremely remote.  If in the middle of a desert there's a runway, some fiel tanks, and some buildings... congratulations you've found some semi-secret remote military industrial complex test site, or where they keep the aliens; you get the idea.  If the speed of the plane is between 300-350, and the height is stable, that's the sweet spot, and you know there is either something there, something was there previously, or they thought something could be there, and wanted a closer look.
• Open Street Maps makes it easy to spot government facilities, as they're usually large pink sections of the map. Have a look at https://www.openstreetmap.org/ if you're struggling to name a site, and you might find it spelled out to you.

This is an Open Skies (OS) Format 14 document, submitted to the Canadian RCAF by the Russian RuAF at the conclusion of one of their Open Skies Treaty flights over Canada.



As I've pointed out previously, there is absolutely no reason any American reading this couldn't request (via FOIA) from the USAF, State Department, or DTRA, ALL the flight plans documented on Open Skies Format 14 templates (like the above) from 2002 to present day.
That will tell you exactly what legs were flown, and where the pictures were taken.

So what are you waiting for?

DND downplays operational impact of Open Skies restrictions by Russia, contrasting the DoD

(U) Canadian and American airmen load wet film in an observation camera
 Photo by Public Affairs Photographer Warrant Officer Robert Granger,
Director General Public Affairs, Ottawa. (IS2007-6013)

Exercising their Open Skies Treaty right, the Russian Federation performed overflights of Eastern Canada at the end of August 2016. The Treaty on Open Skies is a transparency / arms control and verification agreement between 34 countries, which Canada and Russia are signatory to.  Since there was no press release put out by the Department of National Defence about the overflight, I requested an interview to discuss the recent overflight, and other Open Skies topics, with a representative of the Department of National Defence.  Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette, Section Head of Strategic Joint Staff, Arms Control and Verification 4, agreed to meet and speak with me, on the record.

As background to this, you may recall the testimony before congress of Admiral Cecil Haney (Commander, U.S. Strategic Command) February 24th 2016 at the meeting of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Strategic Forces Posture, if not here it is. You may remember Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart (Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency) speaking at the March 2nd 2016 House Armed Services Committee hearing on World Wide Threats; if not, here it is.  You may remember Mr. Brian P. Mckeon (Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense) speaking at the April 14th 2016 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Missile Defeat Posture and Strategy of the United States; if not, here it is.  To sum up, they all spoke rather negatively about Russia and the Open Skies Treaty, painting the Russians as abusing the spirit of the agreement and using it to conduct "foundational intelligence", as well as slamming the Russians' plans to upgrade to an "electro-optical sensor" from wet film.  Perhaps you recall their depiction of the restrictions to Open Skies flights over Russia, phrased to suggest the flights were blocked, when they were not.  Perhaps you remember that Russia was being accused of being in contravention of the treaty.  Then there was the 2016 United States Department of State Compliance Report (here) that outlined what were supposed to be major violations of the treaty in 2015.  There were threats of retaliation, described at length by the House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce, Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes and Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry in a letter to President Obama here.

The Russians came back to Canada for their most recent overflight, with the newly painted, and digital electro-optical sensor-outfitted, Russian Federation Open Skies-approved Tupolev Tu-154M RF-85655.  It was the first Canadian overflight by the Russians to use their new electro-optical sensor, approved by the OSCC in June 2016.  One week prior, the Russians performed an overflight of the United States, with the same digital electro-optical sensor, despite the objections raised in the spring before the congress and threats from congressmen.  Regarding what some call "advanced sensors" used on the Russian open Skies missions, Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette did not use US Lt.Gen Stewart's "Polaroid vs 1080P" comparison, voiced on March 2nd 2016 before the House Armed Services Committee hearing on World Wide Threats. Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette stated:

"30cm resolution for digital, 30cm for wet film; it's like, what's heavier? 5 pounds of iron or 5 pounds of (lead)? 30cm is 30cm." 

The Lieutenant-Colonel, in stark contrast with US officials, is clearly not worried about the new digital electro-optical sensors, which were framed as "advanced sensors" by the American media, fueled by US Government officials' statements.  Before being approved, the sensors were vetted by a multi-national team representing the nations of the OSCC; 30cm resolution is the treaty-mandated imagery resolution limit, both digital and wet film cameras must adhere to the same standards in order to be used on board an Open Skies plane.  There is no significant intelligence advantage that is provided by digital cameras, other than post processing of the original image, removing the need to process hundreds of wet film images and create print duplicates.  Changing the type of sensor from analog to digital is akin to a professional photographer switching from using a 35mm DSLR camera to a digital DSLR camera, assuming both gave the same resolution image.

When asked about Russian restrictions on the Open Skies Treaty overflights over the Russian Federation, and if they impacted the observation missions the RCAF routinely flies over the Russian Federation in those same restricted areas, Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette stated ...

". . . somewhat, but at the end I don't think the treaty is degraded by any shape or form . . . operationally it makes things a little bit more complicated, but not totally (insurmountable), there's always a way."  

Specifically on the topic of the flight distance restriction of 500km imposed over Kaliningrad:

"If I cannot see everything in 500km it doesn't mean I cannot go a 2nd time and do another 500km, if I wanted to do 1000km there; so in the end, is it degraded? Somewhat, because I would rather do it once."

...which, again, is a far cry from the Pentagon / DoD narrative which depicted the Russian-imposed restrictions as being heinous acts, stopping just short of suggesting the United States should pull out of treaty because of them.

United States Marine Corps Lieutenant general Lt. Gen. Stewart, the Director of the US Defence Information Agency, accused the Russians of spying on critical infrastructure and gathering "foundational intelligence"; suggesting that some sites being photographed in the United States by the Russians aren't military in nature, and taking observation photos of them is taking advantage of the treaty for espionage purposes.  I asked RCAF Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette about Russian Open Skies overflights taking aerial photography of infrastructure, power facilities, and other areas of seemingly questionable military value in Canada:

"people have the misconception because we're flying (a) military airplane to do those missions, that (we) are solely looking at military resources . . . every country who flies Open Skies is not solely flying over (military sites)."

Many non-military sites are valuable intelligence targets that would indicate an imminent threat to Russia; rail yards, transportation hubs, factories, power stations... all have military value, and if Canada was preparing for war, they would each show changes.  Green vehicles being moved by rail.  Machines of war being produced at domestic facilities.  Fighter jets being lined up at alternate airfields.  It isn't sufficient to just look at military bases, and Canada doesn't limit our Open Skies Treaty overflights to purely military targets in Russia either. (more here)

I was very pleased to have the opportunity to speak with Lieutenant-Colonel Veillette, and hope I will be able to do so again.  As the Section Head of SJS ACV 4, the unit which performs the Open Skies overflights by Canada, facilitates Russian overflights of Canada, and facilitates transit of Russian Open Skies missions en-route to the United States, his in-depth insight and experience clarified several topics of interest.

Russian Open Skies Treaty overflight of the USA | September 26th-30th 2016

Nevada Test Site - Gate 1
Taken April 2 2010 - Photo by Bill Ebbesen (Wikipedia)

While I don't intend to blog about every single Open Skies Treaty overflight of the United States of America by the Russian Air Force, Nevada is a hub of historically significant military sites, and continues to be a hotbed of military testing facilities, restricted airspace, and military bases. Generally, the Russian Air Force doesn't pick the places they photograph; they are the operators and tip of the spear;.  The RuAF execute requests by other agencies for imagery of American locations of interest, not just requests from the Russian Ministry of Defence. Since each Open Skies mission has a limited amount of distance it can cover, as mandated by the Treaty, the Russians do not try and fly over all of the US at once, they break it up into zones. This flight was an observation mission over California and Nevada. If you zoom in to a reasonable detail level and follow the flight path you'll find a "who's who" (a what's what?) of DoD and DoE locations, as well as other places of interest to the Russian Federation.  Reverse-engineering this flight path, you can discern where the US Military is conducting their most sensitive testing, training, research, and any number of other "interesting" things.

Previous Open Skies treaty posts here for background.

Thank you @ktul_adsb for spotting additional points of interest!

NB: RF-85655 just took off en route to CFB Trenton, Iceland, and ultimately Kubinka (Кубинка) Air Base, originating from Travis AFB where last week's mission was being based from.

Tracking Russian Open Skies Tu-154M / Tu-214ON Aircraft

Photo by Mark Beal (@veryboeing) during RF-85655's stop-over in Halifax, Nova Scotia on 2016-09-01

While American Open Skies flights have been using the same planes since the Treaty on Open Skies (Open Skies Treaty) came into force in 2002, the Russian Federation are phasing in a new pair of Tupolev Tu-214ON planes.  The Tupolev Tu-154M is still being used for Canadian / US / Danish overflights, and I am not sure how long it will be before the Tu-214ON takes over.

Tupolev Tu-154M/LK-1
Reg: RA-85655
C/N 89A798
ICAO 194E97 (154E97?)

Tupolev Tu-214ON
Reg: RA-64519
C/N 42709019
ICAO 14FC07

Reg: RA-64525
C/N 41003025
ICAO 14FC0D

It seems like only RA-64525 can be found on adsbexchange.com, and neither of the new planes can be found on flightradar24.com.  Hopefully they fix that soon!

Tracking American Open Skies OC-135B/W Aircraft

"An OC-135B aircraft sits on an airfield at Ulan-Ude, Russia prior to an Open Skies flight.
DTRA conducts inspection flights with the U.S. Air Force in accordance with the Open Skies treaty."
(DTRA photo - March 3, 2009) Flickr

The United States operates two Open Skies Treaty-approved planes designed to perform observation missions over Russia, or other countries.  The aircraft are based out of Offutt AFB for ops, training and maintenance, and function as part of the 55th Wing, 45th Reconnaissance Squadron (per Wikipedia).

The United States Air Force does not publish press releases, or mention to the media, when they perform Open Skies Treaty overflights; to keep track of the flights using OSINT, adsbexchange.com and flightradar24.com can be leveraged.  

Using Google, the tail numbers became clear  (Registration / ICAO):

Boeing OC-135B Open Skies (61-2670 / AE08D5)
Boeing OC-135W Open Skies (61-2672 / AE08D6)

While the transponder beaconing from 61-2670 broadcasts that it is a Boeing OC-135B, 61-2672 reports itself as an OC-135W.  Contradictory information online suggests both planes are of the OC-135W variety, but I can't find the differences between one and the other.  It could be a cosmetic difference, I'm unclear what the difference in designation would be between the OC-135B and OC-135W.  Regardless, if you sign up for an account on FlightRadar24.com you can program an alert to be emailed to you when the flights are detected by one of their global network of receivers.

If you want to look at historical flight information, adsbechange.com may be more useful for that task (and free!).

Here is a direct link to a dynamic report containing the most recent OC-135B/W flights (it takes a while to load, hang tight)

Callsigns

There is some confusion about the callsigns that are used, and it comes from the historical report mentioned above.  It seems that when an Open Skies overflight mission is underway, the callsign used, for either airframe, is OSY12F (does F stand for overFlight?), and when the plane is in transit the callsign is OSY12T (does this indicate "in Transit"?).  

The two planes also use other callsigns; and I'm not sure what they are otherwise commonly used for, if they are indicative of any specific operations that are not Open Skies related.  

From October 13th 2015 and September 17th 2016 I noticed the following callsigns being used by 61-2670 and 61-2672, as documented on adsbexchange.com

COBRA12
COBRA23
COBRA24
COBRA32
COBRA35
COBRA43
COBRA44
COBRA45
COBRA46
COBRA52
COBRA53
COBRA55
COBRA70
COBRA72
SABRE35
TORA82
TRUBS72

...suggestions as to what operations these callsigns might be indicative of, or confirmation they mean nothing at all, would be welcome!  ( Some callsigns have been noted previously from 55 Wing / 45 Recon here and here, but do not indicate if they suggest a specific function (training/deployed ops/etc) )

Open Skies Treaty overflight; Russia over Canada 2016

Russian Federation Open Skies Plane
Tupolev Tu-154M LK1
Registration: RA-85655
Mode-S Code: 194E97
Serial Number (MSN): 89A798



Photo by Mark Beal (@veryboeing)
during RF-85655's stop-over in
Halifax, Nova Scotia on 2016-09-01








The Russian Federation held their yearly Canadian Open Skies Treaty mission this past week, arriving at CFB Trenton from Washington DC, on the heels of their previous Open Skies Treaty mission in the United States.  The Russians landed at CFB Trenton on August 27th ~1830Z, and departed for Russia on September 3rd ~1900Z.

Since the treaty came into force in 2002, states who are signatory to the Treaty on Open Skies (also known as the Open Skies Treaty) can conduct a treaty-defined maximum number of yearly overflights of other signatory nations, with a maximum flight distance dependant from where they are taking off from in that country, and only certain airports in signatory nations are approved for these observation planes to land.  Not all countries have approved planes; with approved sensors, or approved cameras.  Those that don't piggy-back on the flights of other signatory states.  The purpose of these flights is to take pictures of the other signatory members' military and industrial facilities to build confidence that the "other side" isn't amassing troops or tanks on the border, out of conventional view, or hiding from satellite imagery, but located perhaps where a closer-to-the-ground plane would be able to photograph them.  The overflights are conducted at a height and speed that allows for 30cm resolution imagery, which is slightly less detailed than publicly available commercial satellite imagery today.  There are 34 states who are party to the agreement today, including Canada, the United States, and the Russian Federation.  My previous posts about the Open Skies Treaty are here.

Several people have asked why this visit by the Russian Air Force is important, or news-worthy; this is a treaty that has been in place since 2002, and overflights happen routinely.  It's a good question with a complicated answer.  Most importantly to me; most Canadians don't know a level of cooperation exists with the Russian Federation that would allow them to overfly Canada and take pictures of anything they want, anywhere, coast to coast to coast.  Most Canadians don't know that Canada does the same over Russia, flying over their territory more than once a year, and photographing anything, anywhere.  Right now, perhaps more than ever, the rhetoric out of some factions of world governments would like to vilify the Russian or American governments as evil empires intent on world domination.  Leveraging the imagery attained from Open Skies overflights can diffuse some of those wild rumours.  Treaties like the Open Skies Treaty show that world powers can actually work together and cooperate. Treaties work when they are negotiated in good faith, and applied in good faith.  The Open Skies Treaty is, in my opinion, a poster child for successful treaties and diplomatic negotiation, despite minor issues in its application over Russian Federation territory.  Interestingly, while the treaty and overflights are not highly classified endeavours, neither the American or Canadian governments publish press releases about them when they occur, but will answer questions when asked.  Russian media (TASS, Sputnik, etc) publish the flight is going to take place right before it happens; this is true for flights over Russia, or flights being conducted by Russia over other countries.

While the Russians could visit Canada more often (per the treaty), the past twelve years of flights show the Russians come to Canada about once a year to overfly Canadian military and industrial facilities.  Using FlightRadar24.com, the route the Open Skies flight was taking was documented during the flight, and posted to Google Maps, prior to requesting the official mission plan from the Department of National Defence via Access to Information.  The "catch" regarding using the freely available FlightRadar24.com data was, the route had to be in range of civilian transponder receivers to allow MLAT triangulation to work.  Military planes do not always broadcast their position by ADS-B transponder, so triangulation of their location is necessary.

Unfortunately only half of the flight was caught in this manner, likely due to the northerly points they were travelling to, and how far away they were from civilian receivers and plane spotter enthusiasts.  The rest of the data points will hopefully become available over the next several months.

From the flight path and previous visits educated guesses about what they were taking pictures of can be made.  We know the Russian overflights take pictures of both current military facilities, and decommissioned facilities; I presume to make sure they were shut down, and stay shut down.  The below map has been marked with likely targets of their Open Skies Treaty sanctioned IMINT mission.

Embiggen the map by clicking the square at the top right of the embedded map below

Map of RuAF flight, locations likely photographed, and all Treasury Board locations (except the 3 Northernmost)

After leaving Canada, RF-85655 refuelled in Iceland on its way back to the Russian Federation, first landing at Kubinka (Кубинка), where I speculate some of the flight crew disembarked, then on to  Chkalovsky (Чкаловский) where I (again) speculate the plane will undergo maintenance.  Kubinka (Кубинка) is where previous film developing has taken place, and I assume if the film was being processed there, a lodger reconnaissance unit is stationed there as well.  Since the cameras onboard the flight are now digital, no film processing will be needed, but I theorize the unit is located in the same place where they previously processed film, so the crew who were manning the sensors aboard the flight potentially disembarked there.  Kubinka (Кубинка) is also where other states' Open Skies missions start from, when nations arrive to overfly the Russian Federation under the Open Skies Treaty.

I will hopefully have a significant update to this story later in the month.

Senate bill calls for restrictions on Russian Open Skies Treaty overflights of the US

On July 14th 2016 a Simple Resolution was passed in the Senate. The sponsor of this bill was Tom Cotton, Junior Senator from Arkansas (R). Being a Canadian, the term Simple Resolution was foreign to me, but it doesn't seem to be a law, but more of a finger-wagging statement, which says:

S.Res. 544: A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding compliance enforcement of Russian violations of the Open Skies Treaty.

"... it is the sense of the Senate that— (1) restrictions upon the ability of Open Skies Treaty aircraft to overfly all portions of the territory of a State Party impede openness and transparency of military forces and activities and undermine mutual understanding and confidence, especially when coupled with an ongoing refusal to address compliance concerns raised by other States Party subject to such restrictions; (2) it is essential to the accomplishment of the purpose of the Open Skies Treaty that Open Skies Treaty aircraft be able to observe the entire territory of a State Party in a timely and reciprocal manner as provided for under the Open Skies Treaty; (3) the Russian Federation’s restrictions upon the ability of Open Skies Treaty aircraft to overfly all portions of the territory of the Russian Federation constitute violations of the Open Skies Treaty; and (4) for so long as the Russian Federation remains in noncompliance with the Open Skies Treaty, the United States should take such measures as are necessary to bring about the Russian Federation’s return to full compliance with its treaty obligations, including, as appropriate, through the imposition of restrictions upon Russian overflights of the United States." (ref here and here)

This Bill is a politically motivated punitive measure spurned on by lobbyists for the defence industry, under-informed politicians looking to score points riding the Red Scare wave, political appointees, and the head of the DIA, who I've written about before (cited below). For a host of reasons, like desperate caged animals, the these people have been rabbidly spreading the narrative of a renewed Red Scare of Russia, and trying to convince the American people that Russians are spying over the US with these "treaty overflights". Further, they state these overflights have now become "vital tools" for Russia's intelligence collection, even though the plane's cameras produce 30cm resolution photos, which are similar in resolution to commercial satellite photos.

Opponents of the Open Skies Treaty need Americans to be afraid of the Russians, as they were of the Soviet Union. It seems the only way the American military can get more funding is by having a nefarious super-power to duel with. Repeated statements about Russian "RESTRICTIONS" on overflights of Russia have been parroted by the media, with no fact-checking or elaboration regarding what "restrictions" they are talking about. The impression given is that Russia is *blocking* overflights of large pieces of Russia, hiding invasion forces, and obstructing arms inspections of the country at every turn.

This is somewhere between fantasy, wishful thinking, and an extreme stretch of the facts. Almost none of it is true. Almost. The restrictions put in place by the Russians are mostly in contravention of the agreement as it is written; TRUE. However, the restrictions do not impede the inspection of the entire territory of the Russian Federation, very small portions of Russia have had any restriction at all, and nothing is "hidden" by any of the restrictions.  I've already covered the misinformation these factions are trying to spread here, here and here.

Russia's "Restrictions" imposed on other states' overflights are as follows:

• Limited distance allowed for flights over Kaliningrad (not unreasonable)
• Treaty-defined 10km restriction from border with independent states (Breakaway republics of Georgia, dovetails into unrelated border dispute)
• Restricted airspace over some of Moscow forcing a higher overflight (not outrageous)
• Restricted airspace over Chechnya forcing a higher overflight (also not surprising)
• Declaring "Force majeure" on an unknown (2? 3?) overflights since 2011 due to VIP on the ground (certainly poor form)

I really don't see any of these are so bad that you'd want to start contravening an Arms Verification treaty to prove a point.  If the USA is going to arbitrarily impose restrictions on Russian overflights without getting the approval of the OSCC it will be as much in the wrong as Russia is.  If these are such egregious affronts to the treaty, why is no other country crying foul?  There are 32 other Nations, other than the United States and Russia, who have not voiced objections to these issues with the same fervour as the United States.  Why haven't the Americans convened a meeting regarding these issues and come up with a resolution put forth by the rest of the signatory parties to the Treaty?  Why is it the United States is doing these punitive measures alone and without any other country's support?  What measures are they even considering?  Will they be proportional to what Russia is imposing?  Tit-for-tat?

---

Not a misquote, they are his own written words from his own column here

Let me introduce you to Junior Senator from Arkansas USA Tom Cotton, a Republican; why?  Because I believe he routinely recklessly endangers the world, and is a horrible misogynist, despite graduating from Harvard and being a decorated former Army Captain, and veteran of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

He was also called a "mutinous" by a General over the letter he (and 46 others) sent to Iran which was against the US national interest and the narrative Obama was broadcasting during the nuclear deal negotiations.  You could read this.  He has also been routinely called out for taking money from hard-line Israeli lobbyists and significant donations from defence contractors.  This man is a one man war machine.

War is good for business.

If this man is advocating reprisals against Russia for minor infractions of the Open Skies Treaty, you should be wondering how this benefits the people who fund him; specifically the extremely arms industry and their deep pockets.

Peace isn't good for business.

---

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-11-012; Russia over Canada in 2011

 Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
 Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

Indeed this is becoming repetitive, but here we have the 2011 Flight Plan for the Russian Open Skies treaty overflight of Canada.  Clearly this time the focus was on hitting all of the West Coast locations with any military interest.  The data I was provided from DND looked like it was printed, scanned, printed, scanned again, and altered in various programs along the way; so while legible to the human eye, it is causing problems with my OCR software.  If any of the data points aren't exactly where they should be, I apologize, but that's as good as it gets!

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-12-018; Russia over Canada in 2012

Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

I'm working backwards through the flight plans and mission reports of Russian overflights of Canada under the Open Skies Treaty, and I am noticing some similarities and trends.  Since they only have ~5000-6000km according to the treaty to use in one mission, they can't visit every since military facility; but they make a really good effort.  The Russians have a few favourite locations they like to visit as often as possible; CFAD Dundurn and CFB Suffield are two of those locations.  Former Pinetree Line Long Range Radar Stations are favourites; after all, why would we decommission them and not build something in the same spot?  Any and all military bases are obvious targets of areal photography as well; Cold Lake, Kingston, Borden (w/ CFAD Angus), etc...

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-13-020; Russia over Canada in 2013

Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

As a follow-on to my previous post and the one before that on Open Skies Treaty overflights of Canada, here are the 2013 coordinates where cameras were engaged and disengaged, and flight paths.  This mission was performed between 2013-06-15 and 2013-06-20.

Click the square bracketed icon at the top right of the map to blow it up full-screen so you can read it better.

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-14-032; Russia over Canada in 2014

Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

As I mentioned previously, I requested, via Access to Information, from DND, all the flight plans performed under the Open Skies Treaty which were flown over Canada by the Russians until 2014 - and somehow got them!  So now I'm looking to find out what the Russians thought would be so important hat they would spend ~$150,000 to fly over here, shack up in some of our finest rural hotels, and buzz around Canada taking pictures of our great country.  Of course everyone would love to spend a week flying over Canada and getting away from it all, but their choice of things to photograph is sometimes a little odd.  The Diefenbunker?  Really?

I'm looking for you to identify some of the less obvious legs of the trip.  along the flight plan you'll see "START" and "STOP"; this is where the photos started to be taken, and stopped being taken.  If they weren't shooting photos at the time, they were travelling to the next leg where more photos would be taken; pretty simple.  It is plain to see they took photos of former Pinetree Line Radar sites (such as Alsask) and the former CFB Carp; but some of the other areas are a mystery to me.

Do you see anything interesting?

(Click the Maximize square at the top right corner of the map to go full screen)

An important USAF first, in the far North of Russia, with help from the RCAF

Tiksi Airfield; I've mentioned it before (here) in relation to former Soviet Long Range Aviation "bounce" bases, where Soviet bombers would refuel on their way over the North pole, on their mission to turn the United States to a nuclear wasteland.

Location of Tiksi

Currently The Open Skies Treaty defines several airfields across signatory countries (such as Russia) where foreign observation planes are allowed to land and operate from, while performing Open Skies Treaty overflights.  One of those airfields is Tiksi, but, never before in the 20+ year history of the Open Skies Treaty have the Americans landed at the airfield on an observation flight.  Why haven't there been any American visits to this arctic location?  The runway is in rough shape, and while it has been reported in the Russian media that the airstrip will be fixed, and perhaps is in the middle of being fixed, it isn't fully repaired yet.  The American Open Skies treaty-approved plane is an Boeing OC-135B; being a 4 engine Jet, with a 5500km range, it requires a full ~8000ft of runway to land and take off.  Due to the condition of that runway, from ice heaves and deterioration of the surface, the OC-135B has been unable to fulfil its missions in Russia's far-North.

Tiksi Airfield

Enter the Royal Canadian Air Force

Canada is also signatory to the treaty, and flies a modified CC-130J Hercules, which is known to be able to land on rough terrain.  Outfitted with "SAMSON" (the RCAF shared Open Skies camera pod) containing a wet film framing camera, and 4 additional sensors, the RCAF plane conducted overflights of the region, with American representatives onboard, from July 4th to 9th 2016.  While the USAF is usually seen as technologically superior to the RCAF, this is one of those cases where the RCAF's choice of Open Skies Treaty-certified plane proved more useful than the more elegant OC-135B.  I think this is a big "win" for the RCAF, and should get more attention than it has.

I'd originally believed this was the first ever flight to Tikisi under the Open Skies Treaty, but previously there has been an Italian/Canadian joint flight, also using a Hercules.

Canadian crew members performing a flight under the Open Skies Treaty over Russia,
pose next to their C-130H aircraft (29 May 2003)
Credit: OSCE/Unknown Photographer

I presume these flights were to check up on the military bases being built or refurbished in Russia's far North, but I have no mission plan or flight plan to base that speculation on, yet.  Specifically I think the Kotelny Island Base(s) and Temp Airfield were on the target list for the observation flight.

In February 2016 Turkey grievously violated the Open Skies Treaty, and nobody cared.

Russian Antonov An-30 Open Skies Plane
© Flickr/ Dmitry Terekhov

I've been boring people with talk about the Open Skies Treaty for months, but what really shocked and disappointed me was the complete lack of international reaction when treaty-signatory member Turkey seriously violated the treaty; nothing publicly came of it, at all.  No public protests from the US, Canada, or any other members; just Russia, who was the signatory member who was trying to do the overflight of Turkey to begin with.

Let me explain with an example; when any nation who is signatory to the Open Skies Treaty proposes to fly over the United States, they table a flight plan on day 1, as soon as they arrive.  The US representatives review that flight plan and consider what they want to overfly, and let the military units along that route know to cover up their super-top-secret stuff because an observation flight is immanent.  But... They do have the option to send the Russians home if a "High Value Activity" would be exposed, and cannot be avoided.  It is the last possible option, and absolutely the least desirable.

Let me bring your attention to:

Air Force Manual 16-604 - Oct 2009
Implementation Of, And Compliance With, The Treaty on Open Skies
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afman16-604.pdf

Specifically what the USAF calls a "High Value Activity" (HVA); the only reason given in the USAF manual to scrub an entire Open Skies Treaty flight.

6.3.2. In general, an HVA is an activity that:
6.3.2.1. Will incur substantial monetary cost if postponed or cancelled,
6.3.2.2. Cannot be concealed and reveals national security information if observed,
6.3.2.3. Takes advantage of a unique set of chronological or meteorological circumstances which cannot be duplicated, or
6.3.2.4. The command/agency believes special circumstances apply

Meaning, if a Russia requests an overflight, and a flight plan tabled, for an overflight of the United States, and some "high value activity" is going on, they might refuse the whole flight.  Take for an example a satellite launch that has a short window of opportunity; they can't have a Russian Open Skies plane flying over a rocket launch site; not for "national security" reasons, but practical reasons - they don't want to accidentally hit the Russian plane.  Alternatively, an HVA could be a scheduled test of a new military technology that they don't want the Russians to see, and can't be hidden or the time of the test changed for some reason.

The manual goes on to say...

6.3.5. With each HVA Report, the unit/MAJCOM must indicate their recommendation associated with this HVA.
6.3.5.1. If the HVA can be deconflicted, the recommendation would likely be to report the HVA for information only.
6.3.5.2. If the unit’s preference is to seek to negotiate around the event, negotiating guidance will be given to the DTRA Escort Team Chief.
6.3.5.3. If the recommendation is to avoid the HVA, then the reporting unit will need to provide the name and immediate contact information for the senior flag officer supporting the HVA. This recommendation is a recommendation to violate a legally binding international treaty. This scenario is serious and will involve guidance from the HVAG or higher.

To summarise, if there is something that can't be moved or deconflicted, like a super-secret item out in the open that can't be hidden and would cause embarrassment or compromise national security if photographed, the military has the option to scrub the whole Open Skies overflight, if they can't negotiate their way out of it with the overflying nation.  They know that's the absolute worst case, since it would "violate a legally binding international treaty".  The last thing the US Military wants to do is put itself into a front-page news conflict about covering up some secret activity it was trying to hide in the first place; it is absolutely the last recourse to cancel the entire overflight.

But, that's exactly what Turkey did.  Obviously Turkey has their own playbook, and I don't have the Turkey Open Skies field manual, but I bet as a fellow NATO member they don't want to be front page treaty-violation news either.  Conveniently, Western media gave them a pass on the whole ordeal, likely because nobody understood what was going on, because the US, as a matter of policy, doesn't publicise or talk about the Open Skies Treaty unless asked directly.  It says so in the Air Force manual.

Russia provided one week of notice of its intent to overfly Turkey between February 1st and February 5th 2016.  Russia conducted its previous overflight in in December, shortly after the Turks shot down a Russian fighter bomber under contentious circumstances; you'd think their relationship would have been at it's worst, but the overflight went ahead anyway.  Upon the Russians' arrival in February, just like every other time, the Russians tabled a flight plan.  This time, Turkey and Russia could not agree on a flight plan; meaning Russia wanted to overfly something specific, and Turkey said no.  The only way out of that impasse, is for Turkey to contravene the treaty entirely, and send the Russians home.  I conclude they must have hit an HVA situation, as is outlined in the USAF manual under 6.3.5.3.  I don't know what other reason they could have.  The question, of course, is what was it that was a HVA that the Russians wanted to overfly?  The proposed flight plan was not released by either the Russians or the Turks.  The flight plan is unclassified (not Secret or Top Secret), and nowhere in the treaty are signatory nations barred from being released; it can be made public if they want to make it so.  I sent requests to the Russian MFA, Russian Embassy in Canada and Russian OSCE via Twitter - with no response (nor did I expect to hear anything back, but hey, why not try?)

I think it's quite possible, since Turkey is hosting American and other NATO forces, that coalition forces that were not publically disclosed ( like... a drone base, a foreign Special Forces base, deployed Electronic Warfare equipment, foreign artillery, foreign MLRS, etc.. ) could have been dug in along the flight route, and the Turks (or foreign nation (Americans?)) did not want their forces photographed, as they were not disclosing to their citizens they had those forces in place.  If we go with the narrative the Russians are pushing in their media, the overflight was scrubbed to hide Turkish cooperation with IS/ISIL/ISIS/Daesh forces smuggling arms and oil across the border.
The Turkish statement (quoted below) to the media says that in December 2015 (right after the Russian fighter-bomber was shot down) the Russian Open Skies flight plan was approved and flown with the modifications to the flight plan; these changes were proposed by the Turks and agreed to by the Russians.  So why couldn't they negotiate through this flight plan?

None of this Russian-Turkish Open Skies hubbub was picked up on by the Western media.
No analysis or in depth reporting was done.
Why is that?

Here is the official statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tanju Bilgiç, regarding the failed Russian Open Skies Treaty flight:

"QA-4, 4 

February 2016, Statement of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tanju Bilgiç In Response to a Question Concerning the Open Skies Treaty Observation Flight over Turkey that could not be conducted by the Russian Federation
The Treaty on Open Skies, envisaged as a confidence and security building measure in the OSCE geography, was opened for signature in 1992. Currently 34 states, including Turkey are parties to the Treaty. The Treaty establishes a regime that permits States Parties to conduct aerial observation flights over the territories of other States Parties in accordance with distributed quotas.
Observation flights are performed when the observing Party and the observed Party reach agreement on the mission plan. In the case of the observation flight requested by the Russian Federation for 2-5 February 2016, agreement could not be reached on the mission plan and the flight has thus not been conducted.
The limitations imposed by the Russian Federation on observation flights over its own territory is already known by all States Parties to the said Treaty. On the other hand, the observation flight of the Russian Federation in Turkey in December 2015, was conducted on the basis of mission plan changes as suggested by Turkey." (ref here)

That statement says pretty much nothing.  The Russian "restrictions" placed on Open Skies flights over Russia do not prohibit overflights, and have nothing to do with this overflight anyway.

Russian MoD Statement:

http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12076588@egNews

Quotes:

"First of all, it is to be reminded that the Russian Federation was to have conducted an observation flight over the territory of the Turkish Republic on February 1-5, 2016 in accordance with the Treaty on Open Skies. A preliminary approval for the flight had been received from the Turkish party within the time limits prescribed by the Treaty."

Meaning Russia gave Turkey seven days notice that they would be conducting an overflight, and Turkey agreed, which is normal.

"Yesterday a group of Russian observers arrived at the Turkish airport Eskisehir and submitted the route of the observation flight to Turkish representatives as it’s required under the Treaty."

This shows the Russian flight crew, and treaty-allowed plane, with appropriate sensor suite, arrived and proposed their flight plan and mission plan.  Nothing unusual.

"However, the Turkish Defense Ministry officials refused the Russian specialists to perform the observation flight over the areas adjacent to Syria, as well as over the airfields with concentrations of NATO aviation and without any specific explanation at that."

So it goes pear-shaped at this point; Turkish officials had 4 hours to negotiate and agree to a flight plan with the Russians, but they didn't like something in the flight plan, and said no - or proposed changes to go around the area of interest that the Russians didn't agree to, effectively saying no.  Russian sources have stated that the Turks haven't wanted overflights near Patriot missile batteries along the border with Syria, and at the air bases where coalition planes are operating from.  Maybe there are aircraft that are deployed to the coalition airbases that nobody has admitted to, but I can't imagine what sort of planes those would be.  Heavy strategic bombers?  Undisclosed attack helicopters?  An uptick in USAF C-17 transport aircraft landing in Turkey was noticed by plane watching enthusiasts around the same time.  Was this related?

Interestingly (to me) the Incirlik Air Base houses American and Turkish B-61 nuclear bombs.  Maybe the Russians wanted to have a look at the readiness of the hangers which have the B-61 bombs hidden underneath in vaults?
Maybe nuclear-capable fighters are already positioned in those hangers?
Could there be nuclear saber rattling going on that neither side wants to admit to in public?

I'm sure they won't tell us the real reason the Turkish Open Skies flight was denied in February 2016, but it would be nice to have a better idea of what is really going on.

TASS news stories on the Turkish refusal to grant the overflight
(which are arguably official statements from the Russian side)

Feb 2, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/defense/853806
Feb 3, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/defense/854345
Feb 4, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/world/854458
Feb 4, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/politics/854677
Feb 5, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/politics/854715
Feb 19, 2016  http://tass.ru/en/politics/858021

I believe this is the most notable event in the Open Skies world this year.

Why?

Because Syria is at war, they are a Russian ally, with Russian and Iranian troops on the ground, in Syria.  Rumours of Turkey preparing for a ground invasion of Syria had been floating around for months.  Turkey has been meddling with cross border affairs, including incursions into Syrian territory by armoured units, and shelling villages inside Syria from Turkey.  Doing an overflight of their border region to make sure they are not amassing an army to cross the border is *exactly* what the Open Skies Treaty was written for; but it was blocked easily, and without any significant media coverage.

How can that be?