Do efforts to kill the Open Skies Treaty, and the al-Baghdadi raid, cross paths?

As posted to Medium March 4, 2020

Do efforts to kill the Open Skies Treaty, and the al-Baghdadi raid, cross paths?

https://steffanwatkins.medium.com/do-efforts-to-kill-the-open-skies-treaty-and-the-al-baghdadi-raid-cross-paths-e33d991e580f

Inside the U.S. Senate resolution to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty.

As published on Medium on March 3, 2020

Inside the U.S. Senate resolution to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty.

It’s a Gong Show.

https://steffanwatkins.medium.com/inside-the-u-s-senate-resolution-to-withdraw-from-the-open-skies-treaty-4cbad67f3981

Open Skies Treaty Update, February 2020

Published on Medium, February 19, 2020:

Open Skies Treaty Update, February 2020

An independent attempt to explain Vayl Oxford’s update to the House Armed Services Committee regarding the Open Skies Treaty.

https://steffanwatkins.medium.com/open-skies-treaty-update-february-2020-132141965188

We will bury you (in data) - Russian Navy Yantar backgrounder and Summer 2016 Trip Report.

I read the modern propaganda being parroted on social media. Twitter accounts allege to have seen or heard things on the news, with no precise source, but claim it sounded "right", and according to their bias, they believe it to be true. This cycle repeats itself almost daily. It's disappointing, and disheartening, especially when the media is routinely misled by sources who so boldly mislead them. Some (even many) journalists aren't aware at the time, and sometimes are never aware that they've been lied to. Unsuspecting people will parrot the information they get from the media, who are just reporting what they were told, from sometimes-trustworthy and believed-to-be reputable sources, with no idea they're complicit in perpetuating a lie. Thankfully, this isn't the 1950s anymore, and the power to fact-check many topics that were previously exclusive to the government with spy satellites and covert operations is now in the hands of the people. Today, anyone can find someone in Vladivostok and ask them to take a picture of a ship in front of them using their iPhone. It's a whole different world, and the public needs to aggressively fact-check the stories that are being fed to the media by both military and political factions worldwide.

I would like everyone to fact-check the Canadians, fact-check the Russians, fact-check the Americans; fact-check every side. Publish your findings for everyone to read, with facts and references that can be checked. There is nothing more patriotic than proving to the world that your government isn't lying to you. But what if they are, and you expose it..? Well, that's not your fault, now is it?

One of my least favourite pieces of propaganda is the rumour being spread that the Russian Navy AGOR Yantar is tapping and/or preparing to cut/detonate commercial telecom cables that stretch across the Atlantic. I didn't want to get into exactly how this came about, but "anonymous officials" have been less than truthful. I believe US Government leaked statements, through "anonymous" officials, about the ship being capable of cutting cables; the DoD was concerned about their secret military cables that run across the ocean to remote deployments and bases. Somewhere along the way, with or without help from "government officials", the media switched the narrative to direct focus toward commercial telecom cables. "The Internet", they said, was what Russia was after, all of a sudden.

David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt of the New York Times reported October 25th, 2015 that the Russian Navy AGOR Yantar "cruised slowly off the East Coast of the United States on its way to Cuba — where one major cable lands near the American naval station at Guantánamo Bay".

Green = >12.5 Knots, Yantar's top speed is ~14-15
Map Data from MarineTraffic.com
Illustration by Steffan Watkins
(using Google Fusion Tables & Google Maps API)

Slowly? While "slowly" is subjective, there is nothing subjective about the AIS data the ship was transmitting for most of the transit from near Halifax Nova Scotia to Havana Cuba, which shows the ship was at full speed, and with the wind at their backs they even got up past 16 knots. How did Mr Sanger and Mr Schmitt arrive at the conclusion the ship sailed slowly, anywhere? Anonymous government officials? Unfortunately neither Mr Sanger or Mr Schmit fact-checked these claims with OSINT data (to be fair, I didn't check in October 2015 either)

"Off the East Coast" is a frequently used term, that is hugely subjective. Everyone has a different interpretation regarding what constitutes "off the coast". Legally, sovereign territorial waters extend only 12 nautical miles, and the EEZ extends 200 nautical miles; so where was Yantar?  Until they approached Cuba at the end of their transit, their closest point was hundreds of miles away from the coast. Once again, government officials chose to mislead Mr Sanger and Mr Schmitt, rather than provide a verifiable number that could be fact-checked to give an illusion of their proximity to the US coast that simply didn't exist.

Maybe the anonymous government officials didn't want to give the New York Times "Top Secret" US Navy intelligence about the ship's location, but... I just gave you a map. How did I do that? The Russian Navy vessel Yantar is a research vessel, classified as an AGOR, a relatively ordinary, but new and advanced, Russian Navy oceanographic research ship; and while ultimately I'm sure Yantar is doing more than looking for whales, their location isn't a secret to anyone outside The Pentagon. They're broadcasting their location both to AIS satellite based receivers, and terrestrial receivers, for the entire world to watch. They beacon their precise location frequently, every few minutes to local marine traffic over Marine VHF.

Mr Sanger and Mr Schmitt correctly stated the vessel was headed to Havana, but they left fact-based reporting behind when they linked the Russian ship's movements to the Guantanamo Bay cable that comes ashore at the base in Guantanamo Bay. Yantar was never anywhere near Guantanamo Bay's cable demarcation point, or even the South side of Cuba, where Guantanamo Bay is, nor did they stop where the cable was expected to have been laid by USNS Zeus. I speculate this was either a misunderstanding, or deliberate misinformation being sewn by the "anonymous" government officials.

Mr Sanger and Mr Schmitt continued and quoted US Navy Admiral Mark Ferguson, commander of US Naval Forces in Europe. 

"Citing public remarks by the Russian Navy chief, Adm. Viktor Chirkov, Admiral Ferguson said the intensity of Russian submarine patrols had risen by almost 50 percent over the last year. Russia has increased its operating tempo to levels not seen in over a decade." [MISLEADING]

-Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort, New York Times, October 25, 2015.

If those truisms sound familiar to you, I already went over how both the US Navy and Russian Navy have a symbiotic relationship regarding their bravado, threats, and posturing (here). In short; the Russians promote their successes, and the US increase their already ridiculous military budget to counter their claims, regardless of how hollow, validating the Russian Navy's ego, enabling further peacocking. It's true that the Russian Navy operations are at their highest since the Cold War. That's a truism because there were no submarine patrols when the Soviet Navy fell apart, and any number of patrols now is higher than none.
"Intensity" of Russian submarine patrols is up "Almost" 50% the Admiral said in 2015. That's likely a reference to days at sea, which I explain in the previous blog post too, and we already know those numbers are, at best, 20% of Cold War levels, using declassified CIA data.

Let me paraphrase then, using OSINT to fill-in the blanks that US Navy Admiral Mark Ferguson, commander of US Naval Forces in Europe, left out of his statement:

Russian submarine patrols spent 50% more time at sea, over the year before, raising the number of days spent at sea to almost 20% of what they were during The Cold War, according to declassified CIA assessments of Soviet Navy out of area deployments from the 1980s. -Steffan Watkins, paraphrasing US Navy Adm Ferguson

See how that statement loses a lot of air when you un-cloak the numbers behind it?

Over a month before the New York Times ran their much-quoted piece, seasoned journalist and senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon Bill Gertz published his bombshell piece September 3rd 2015, after being contacted by anonymous Pentagon officials about the same story. For unknown reasons there was no credit given to Mr Gertz in the New York Times piece, so let me review the truth (and un-truths) he was given by the Pentagon officials who were, evidently, trying to get the story out in the media.

"U.S. intelligence (is) closely watching a Russian military vessel in the Atlantic that has been sailing near a U.S. nuclear missile submarine base and underwater transit routes, according to Pentagon officials." [FALSE]&[TRUE]

-U.S. Shadowing Russian Ship in Atlantic Near Nuclear Submarine Areas, Washington Free Beacon, September 3, 2015

See map above; they could have been watching underwater transit routes to and from King's Bay, but they were (arguably) not "near" King's Bay as Mr Gertz' source stated; that's a stretch. Notice that the New York Times didn't mention reconnaissance of paths that US nuclear ballistic submarines transit in their piece over a month later?

"Defense officials (..) say the Yantar is believed to be gathering intelligence on underwater sensors and other equipment used by U.S. nuclear submarines based at Kings Bay, Georgia." [TRUE]

-U.S. Shadowing Russian Ship in Atlantic Near Nuclear Submarine Areas, Washington Free Beacon, September 3, 2015

That's another very important statement the New York Times piece seemed to miss; they are gathering intelligence on US sensors; SOSUS's successors, IUSS, etc.  That seems like the sort of thing any adversary would want to know; where are the hydrophone arrays?
What new technology is being deployed to detect Russian submarines?

"A major target of the program is the Department of Defense Information Network, known as DoDIN. Moscow is seeking to map the global information network that is vital for U.S. warfighters" 
[TRUE]

-U.S. Shadowing Russian Ship in Atlantic Near Nuclear Submarine Areas, Washington Free Beacon, September 3, 2015

Again, it seems the New York Times piece, published over a month later, didn't want to re-publish that the Russian Navy vessel Yantar was reported by Pentagon officials to be looking for US military cables and sensors. Bill Gertz' original piece, over a month before the New York Times published basically the same story, doesn't mention the Russians coming over to attack the Internet at all, so I can't see where they got that idea, unless an anonymous official wasn't trying to distract them from the truth that Mr Gertz published over a month before.

I understand that journalists do not want to accidentally become part of the story, but in my view, "the story" is now why the New York Times changed and omitted so much relevant information from Bill Gertz' original piece, published over a month before, about the exact same topic. I presume the New York Times reached out to Pentagon officials, to confirm the story, but Pentagon officials refused to confirm the most important details from The Washington Free Beacon's piece, so the New York Times didn't run those parts. They obviously read the piece on the exact same topic from their competing news outlet. Isn't it the original Washington Free Beacon piece we should be paying closer attention to, since it has the superset of information? I strongly suspect Bill Gertz was given a bonafied leak that the Pentagon didn't want out in the open. The NYT piece, even unknowingly, encourages speculation about "other" types of cables that aren't DoD related, and obscures the vulnerability of DoD undersea cable infrastructure that exists. I believe that's the crux of the whole issue; there's a vulnerability, the Russians know it, and they're mapping it out.

Russian Navy AGOR Yantar - Summer 2016 Trip Report

All of the above came as a result of the inaugural voyage of Russian Navy AGOR Yantar during their initial shake-down in 2015, where their stated purpose was to test their equipment.  Fast-forward to Summer 2016, when Yantar was operating for ~3 months in the Northern Atlantic and near the GIUK gap; which has provided  several new interesting places to investigate. My analysis focuses on where the Yantar stops. Ships don't loiter in one spot in the middle of a sea or ocean for a day or two on a whim. You can realistically assume that if a ship, which was built for, and carries Russian Navy's most advanced deep sea equipment, is stationary for more than a few hours, that something of note is going on. While Yantar is equipped with lights for night-time work, when reviewing the data, time of day is important to determine if they have stopped somewhere and are waiting for first light before conducting operations. Using GPS-based AIS-data to try and guess what a ship is doing is just that; guessing. I could be wrong with my assessment of any of these locations, but these are my best guesses based on as much information I could find. If you have a better idea, lay it on me!

While writing a piece for Jane's Intelligence Review I studied the entire 2015 tour (+more), and saw scant evidence that any of their stops were over commercial telecom cables, which throws shade on reports that the Yantar's movements are related to tapping or cutting commercial telecom cables. Did I mention those cables are already charted on nautical charts? They're already mapped and known to the shipping industry, in an effort to avoid them being caught by ships' anchors. On that alone people should realize the publicized "The Ruskies are coming for your Internet" story does not hold water. While Yantar is absolutely conducting operations on behalf of the GUGI, which is the department that would do deep sea covert operations. Any covert action would be done covertly with mini-subs, deployed from a stretched-submarine, that acts as a mothership - not Yantar - which is a big steel very-not-stealthy ship. I believe it's perfectly reasonable to believe the Yantar is tasked with reconnaissance to enable future undersea operations. Also, I don't think it's that hard for our military to tell the public those details flat out, rather than trying to make up excuses for why Yantar is an interesting ship to follow.

Using historical AIS-T (terrestrial) and AIS-S (satellite) data from MarineTraffic.com, we can see between May and July 2016 Yantar departed their home port in Olenya Guba|Оленья Губа and stopped in several places that were... interesting.

At each of the big red push pins the Yantar came to a stop. The more pushpins around the spot they stopped, the more times an AIS signal from that location was received by a satellite overhead. The colour of the dots indicates how fast they were going.

---

Vicinity of the Soviet Navy Submarine K-159
~69.36142, 33.93928

Several stops were made in the Barents Sea immediately outside Murmansk, and one of those was at a site where a Russian Navy submarine (K-159) was lost while being towed to be scrapped, with its two nuclear reactors aboard, killing 9 of the 10 member salvage team aboard the submarine. That story was reported by The Barents Observer here. The environmental survey / report is here.

Close to the site of the Kursk disaster.

They also stopped near the site of the ill-fated Kursk's destruction, despite it not being there anymore. Maybe looking for something they left behind? Were there pieces of the Kursk that were not recovered that they wanted to check in on?

Vicinity of the German Battleship Scharnhorst?
71.9814, 26.96789

Around 2016-06-23 Yantar slowed and may have stopped around 71.9814, 26.96789, which is closer to the wreck of the German Battleship Scharnhorst's official position than the other spot to the NW where they stopped on their way out. There are no indications the two locations are related, but the only item of note in the area that I know of is the Battleship. If it isn't related, then it could be a military undersea cable or sensor, but neither are mapped, suggesting they are not commercially owned.





Arrived: 2016-05-26 for ~12hrs
Location: ~72.54836, 25.08537

Off the Northern coast of continental Norway, this area is composed of sand, clay, and stone, with a depth of around 800-900ft. There are no known cables or wrecks that I was able to find mentioned. The closest bathymetric survey was a German, somewhat nearby, in 1993 (M26-2).

I'm pretty confident it isn't anything pipeline, gas line, or telecom cable related.

---

The Southern tip of Svalbard, Norway, showing the area the Russian Navy Yantar stopped and examined. Nothing charted.

Three distinct places where Yantar had stopped and hovered.

Between 2016-05-27 and 2016-05-28 ~76.31613, 15.17415 Yantar stopped just outside Norwegian territorial waters, off the Southern tip of Svalbard, and concentrating on three distinct sites; what was it they were focused on? The depth is around 900ft/275m at those locations.

There are no wrecks, cables, pipelines, or geological features there that I could find any reference to. I can find nothing note worthy to stop and look at, but they most certainly didn't stop for a "swimex". As the nautical chart shows, no remarkable undersea features are known to be there. NATO comms cable? Cable running to an undersea sensor? Maybe undersea sensors themselves? I don't know. This is selection by elimination.

Yantar then moved over to the middle of the Fram Strait between Norway and Greenland(Denmark); the very middle. Same story. Granted, the three sources of nautical charts I have on hand don't have a lot of data in that area, but there is nothing that suggests a commercial telecom cable would be in that area, or gas line, or any civilian infrastructure, obstruction, or geological feature. However, that location is in the middle of a choke point, and would be a perfect place to put a sensor; hydrophone or otherwise. Can I prove there is a hydrophone array between Svalbard and Greenland? Of course not. If it isn't a sensor of some kind, what was it? Secret cables? A wreck, or three? At least 3 of their other stops were in proximity to sunken nuclear subs, so I wonder, what submarine losses could have happened covertly? Could these be older wrecks? Could they have been looking for some good crab fishing while they were in the neighbourhood?

They stopped at at least three locations in the same vicinity, and travelled in slow deliberate lines. I believe the red dotted line we're seeing is a search for a cable, rather than a geographically known single point or object, like a sensor or wreck. Cables have a little play and travel, since they get pulled up to be repaired and laid down more or less in the same place again.
Let me use an analogy for the search that explains why the pattern of movement is important; If you had a carpeted living room, with an extension cord hidden in the pile of the carpet, you could walk barefoot where you believe the extension cord is, and find where it is with your toes. To find the cable quickest, you'd walk perpendicular to the cable's presumed direction.
At least, that's what I think that's what we're seeing from the transponder's path. Notice the line of red dots, and the crescent of red dots? It was not a full criss-cross zig-zag like a search pattern for something lost on the bottom.

I believe they are looking for multiple undersea cables that are not charted. I suspect they know cables go from A to B, and are therefore searching in a perpendicular line to the cable's run, in the vicinity they expect the cable.  Hopefully that makes sense without a better graphic to explain it. Compared with the pushpins where the Yantar went directly to a location, and seemed to stop over something, it seems like they're doing more of a sweeping search path for something at those three pushpins in the trench on the map.

In the vicinity of ~71.1265, -10.5407

Jan Mayen is a Norwegian island in the Arctic Ocean, but I do not know if it has a current military significance, like providing power for local hydrophones or sensors, but the Yantar stopped on 2016-06-04 at ~71.1265, -10.5407, which is only ~60km from land, and seems to be northeast and very close to a significant sea mount that raises the depth from thousands of feet to only hundreds. Rumour has it hydrophones were positioned in geographically favourable positions for their acoustics. Mounts, cliffs, etc. were reportedly used to position hydrophones at the correct depth to get the best acoustic "view". While it's complete conjecture, it is interesting that NE would be the direction you'd expect Russian submarines to be coming from.

Stopping at a pinch point,
where conventional wisdom would put a hydrophone.

Iceland is one of the founding nations of NATO, and critical to the security of the North Atlantic. At least one set of SOSUS hydrophones was placed NW of the island, and at least one set was placed SE of the island, according to Soviet Navy sources.

Iceland is an island (in case you're unfamiliar with it) and Yantar slowed down and stopped on opposite sides of the island, seeming taking an interest in the NE shore, the shore that faces where Russian Navy subs might potentially be coming from, over the top of Norway. The places they stopped were locations between Iceland, Greenland, and continental Europe; almost like a fence. At the NW side of Iceland they slowed and eventually stopped over an area again ~800-900ft in depth. I'm getting the impression the depth of the water is significant to this investigation.

Right in the middle of the Davis Sill,
a great spot for a hydrophone or sensor?
63.41641,-56.30731

After Iceland, the next stop was getting close to home. Yantar stopped over the Davis Sill; a rise between the Davis Strait and the Labrador Sea, that arguably forces deeply submerged submarines closer to the surface, or sail closer to the bottom, depending how you look at it. This is both a pinch-point, and a location of reduced depth; perfect for identification of submerged submarine using hydrophones, or other sensors. IMO. However, they stopped over a spot which had a depth of ~1400m, but no bathymetric surveys seem to have been done at that exact point, so I'm unsure if there could be a sea mount making the depth less than the surrounding area. Pure speculation. What's in the middle of the Davis Strait that the Russian Navy sailed all the way there to check out? They're a long way from home, and it's undeniably specific; that was no "while we're here" pit-stop. Historically they are very close to a former Cold War sub-hunting base on the West coast of Greenland. It would be an excellent place to put a sensor, I'd think.

Unknown significance
~70.2537,17.2082

Unknown significance
70.25372,17.20824

On the way back from the Davis Strait, Yantar stopped in the Norwegian EEZ, where there is a sandy bottom and a depth of ~820ft. I can't see any significance to this location; no cables, wrecks, etc.

Location of Soviet Navy Mike-Class Submarine K-278 Komsomolets

Finally, something I can put my finger on. They stopped at the location of the Soviet Navy Mike-Class Submarine K-278 Komsomolets, a known wreck that still may have two nuclear torpedoes, if the Americans haven't stolen them, and a fueled reactor. From what I read, the Norwegians are quite concerned with this wreck, and regular surveys are performed by environmental agencies.

I understand that the US Navy, NORAD, and NATO are rather sensitive about publishing where they put their undersea sub-hunting sensors, so I thought... what about the Soviets? Thankfully, there's a lot of expertise out there, and a lot of old documentation from the Cold War that the "Soviets" don't really care about anymore. One such graphic has shown up via two online sources, but I'm very interested in finding the original (for a better scan) or to find more Soviet Navy intelligence files regarding NATO SOSUS/IUSS sensor locations. Why? Because things don't change. From my experience, a mountain top today is just as high and has just as good a view for a long range radar as it did 50 years ago; applying the same idea to the ocean, I would think an old fashioned SOSUS hydrophone array might be obsolete now, but they were all positioned in geographically advantageous positions; I expect those places would be re-used for new sensor systems, which is why I'd like to monitor them for surface activity going forward. Better still, I don't think I'm alone in this pursuit; I'll continue to monitor Russian Navy auxiliary movements and see if they give away the locations of cables or sensor networks, as suggested by their stops at otherwise uninteresting spots.

Soviet diagram of SOSUS locations (original Soviet source unknown) 

Ultimately this circles back to the stories that are being told in the media about Yantar's purpose, claims that it's after telecom cables, that it's after the internet, that the Russians are going to cut the internet and destroy the financial markets. None of the places Yantar stopped in the Summer of 2016 have any connection to the internet or telecom cables. While Yantar could cut cables with the claws of its ROV, it's an overt vessel, and ill-suited for covert operations - cable cutting or tapping would both be covert operations. Yantar's pattern of movement and operations show no signs that they're tapping telecom cables. I believe strongly that they are conducting underwater reconnaissance; helping allies like Iran and Syria with their cable issues, surveying NATO sensor arrays, surveying covert secret cables that are lying around the ocean's floor, checking on lost nuclear weapons on the ocean's bottom, etc.

"Muh, NATO said.."
If you still think Yantar is looking for telecom cables, The Internet, I challenge you to go back and read the quotes from the NATO/NORAD/DoD/USNavy sources to do with the Yantar specifically, and pay particular attention when they speak of Yantar and cables. No military source mentions commercial telecom cables; they all mention cables (wink wink, military cables), and they mention communications (wink wink, NATO/DoD comms), but they do not mention the Internet. The internet story is something the New York Times published in October of 2015, and as far as I understand, misunderstood from the get-go, or were deliberately misled by officials who wanted to cover up what Bill Gertz' article revealed. The September 2015 leak by Pentagon sources to the Washington Free Beacon said nothing about "internet" cables, but did speak of the threat to Secret DoD cables, which makes the earlier article more reputable and accurate.

Credit:

I could not have done this analysis without the help of MarineTraffic.com, and I am very appreciative of the help they have provided. Thank you.

References:

https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/181564/files/LABA_COVERPOSTER.pdf
https://maps.ngdc.noaa.gov/viewers/bathymetry/
https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/gazetteer/

No, Russians did not get a list of Americans who'd lose their security clearance ahead of time.

I'm very annoyed that I even had to write this blog post, as it's a compete waste of time, and I have a new appreciation of the term "busy work". The daily ridiculous conspiracy stories coming out about Donald Trump and his administration are exhausting, and many of hem completely fake - MANY TRUE! (but many more fake) Do I support Trump? Of course not, you git, I'm a pinko-commie-Canadian covered by universal healthcare, and I'm sick and tired of my TV and Radio being saturated with Donald Trump, and crazy conspiracy stories that are easily debunked with minor research, especially when someone has already done the work yesterday, but some people don't think the dead horse has been flogged enough. Just stop it people. Stop the crazy.

There is a rumour suggesting a Russian knew (or requested publicly) who would/should have their US security clearance revoked, before Donald Trump announced it. This is completely and undeniably false, based on a timeline of events (all credit to Daniel Dale of the Toronto Star  https://twitter.com/ddale8/status/1030122540822405121)

2018-07-24 07:13 DST (Ottawa-time):
Here we have Artem Klyushin, a Russian supporter of Putin, calling out the people that Trump will name in two days, who will be losing their clearance - THIS IS PROOF OF COLLUSION*. How could he possibly know who Trump was going to name two days later?!

*No, it's not.

Экс-директоры ЦРУ Джон Бреннан и Майкл Хэйден, экс-директор ФБР Джеймс Коми и его заместитель Эндрю МакКейб, экс-директор Национальной разведслужбы Джеймс Клаппер, экс-советник по нацбезопасности Сьюзан Райс прощаются с доступами к секретным материалам. Welcome to the real world! pic.twitter.com/nBr8zlZeyR

— АРТЕМ КЛЮШИН  (@ARTEM_KLYUSHIN) 24 July 2018

To expand on this for all to see and understand;

Washington Post, 2018-07-23 

Sarah Sanders lists the SAME PEOPLE during the White House press briefing LESS THAN A DAY BEFORE here:

Philip Bump, Washington Post, 2018-07-23 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/07/23/trump-can-revoke-critics-security-clearances-if-he-wants-but-it-likely-wouldnt-change-much/

Analysis: Trump can revoke critics’ security clearances if he wants — but it likely wouldn’t change much https://t.co/dAiYkBgbcO

— Washington Post (@washingtonpost) July 23, 2018

Artem Klyushin reads English, and he has the internet. He woke up, read the news, and found out himself, possibly from the Washington Post, the names of these individuals. This is not hard to believe, at all. "Truthers" who are still flogging this story are sticking to their guns, claiming that even if the timeline of events refutes the "proof", there can be no doubt this was evidence of a Russian connection, and time isn't really a fact at all, it's just an opinion - or something.

I cannot tell you how fed up I am of debunking this garbage. I really do have better things to do. Pardon me, there's a ship story that needs debunking.

Is the US Navy, or NATO Maritime Command, watching the same ships I am?

US Navy P-8A #168440
(2016) Photo Credit to Michael Debock

This evening two plane spotters posted almost identical Tweets, drawing my attention to something I should be, but frequently forget to, keep an eye on. ADS-B transponders, from planes over the Mediterranean.

10 SEP: US Navy P-8A 168440 PS101 departed Sigonella at 1700z - Central Mediterranean mission pic.twitter.com/LJg215zvFI

— Mil Radar (@MIL_Radar) September 10, 2017

2109z 168440 tracking target moving East pic.twitter.com/O6lLSzmr3E

— Mil Radar (@MIL_Radar) September 10, 2017

🇺🇸 US Navy
P-8A 168440 PS101 - Working a Central Mediterranean Mission - Target moving Southeast 🛰 pic.twitter.com/d6n5vV1aGa

— Aircraft Spots (@aircraftspots) September 10, 2017

PS101 direct Sigonella pic.twitter.com/j5WRgrgfGV

— Aircraft Spots (@aircraftspots) September 10, 2017

From this we know from ~1700Z to ~2200Z on September 10th 2017, US Navy Boeing P-8 Poseidon  registration #168440 was circling something off the coast of Malta, or working over an area looking for something.

Well, strangely I've been speculating there may be a Russians arms shipment going to India on (at least) two civilian ships in the area; the Ocean Fortune (MMSI 636013841) and Ocean Dream (MMSI 636016448).  Where were they between 1700Z and 2200Z?  I'm fairly certain the US Navy P-8A is outfitted with night vision capability, possibly using SAR. They may have been waiting for dark in order to inspect the ship at long range, ie without raising suspicion. However, they left their ADS-B transponder on, so they would have been very visible to anyone who was looking for them. Was this an accident? Not usually. The US Navy is usually very aware of their transponders.



I used "large" icons for the time period of the P-8A flight, but without the exact coordinates they flew, you just have to eyeball the screenshots and my map above. What do you think? It sure looks to me like the US Navy wanted a closer look at the RoRo and container ship that may be carrying S400s to India.

A bona fide "Vessel Of Interest"!

Two Russian Open Skies Treaty aerial observation missions over the USA in June 2017

If you're unfamiliar with the Open Skies Treaty, I've written quite a bit about it before, and I highly recommend leafing through the old blog posts to get up to speed.

What you're about to read is coverage that no news organisation (that I'm aware of) is providing you, because USAF policy is to not talk about Open Skies Treaty observation flights.  Yes, like Fight Club. Since no press releases are put out by the USAF, no US media cover the flights, because they don't know what to say, and all the USAF personnel who could say something, are not allowed to per USAF policy.  Page 30, Section 4.2.1.1.4.7, Air Force Manual 16-604 (2009) "posture for OST flights is “passive.” (we) respond to inquiries, but (don't) promote activities" while that does not specifically state that USAF personnel are not allowed to talk about it, the information is classified (a low-level classification) and the treaty is obscure.  If the US Media were trying to confirm when a flight was happening, IF it was happening, their first source would be TASS or Sputnik, which would immediately raise red flags to Western Media editors. After all, why believe these agents of disinformation and Russian propaganda?  Well, maybe because they're the only people who publicise the treaty overflights; of the US over Russia, or Russia over other countries.  Why is it that only Russia tells their people about a 34+ nation treaty that's working extremely well? Why doesn't the US government want their citizens to know they exercise their treaty rights to overfly Russia, and Russia does the same to the USA, on an almost monthly basis?

I don't know. It's a complete mystery to me.

The Russian Federation performed two scheduled aerial observation missions over the United States under the terms agreed upon by the 34-35 nations in the Treaty on Open Skies, or Open Skies Treaty as it is commonly referred to, between June 19th and June 30th, 2017. Per treaty rules, they left, stopped at CFB Trenton, and went back in between overflights.

June 19 - June 23, 2017

The Russian team flew in to Travis AFB, on their Treaty-approved Tupolev Tu-154M, and recently outfitted digital camera, from Moscow, on Monday, and likely negotiated the flight plan they proposed on Tuesday morning with the American team. The US team is assigned to escort them in their observation plane and ensure all restrictions of the overflight are adhered to; heights are as promised, courses are adhered to, etc. From Tuesday to Thursday (Thursday is when the observation flights started) the US military and defence industry would have been alerted, and would likely have been covering up/moving any equipment they did not want photographed that was along the flight path.  This is standard procedure, and known to be a cat and mouse game.  Anything too big to move will simply be photographed, but these flights, while short notice, can be anticipated to a certain extent. They are routine, happen half a dozen times a year, and I don't think any out-in-the-open testing is ever performed without consideration regarding it being photographed by satellites or the Open Skies Treaty overflights.  After all, the Russian Federation (and the Chinese) also have satellites which can (at least) see the visual spectrum, and may also be outfitted with space-borne Synthetic Aperture Radar. After a brief tour of California, the Russian team (with their American handlers aboard) went to Alaska.  Unfortunately, FlightRadar24 and ADSBExchange have terrible coverage up there, and little of the flight was captured by transponder.  From what I gather that may or may not have overflown several air force bases including missile launch facilities.

June 26 - June 30, 2017

The second week's flights took place first over Texas at a low altitude (5000ft), then after a brief stop to uncover the belly mounted framing camera, continued at a higher altitude. On Friday they finished off the New Mexico leg of the trip, overflying many famous historical nuclear test, development, and production facilities.



But what did they take pictures of?  Well, that's an excellent question. I don't know, but I can make some educated guesses, and you can too,  if you follow along:

• Open Skies Treaty flights are based on a negotiation of a flight plan that is proposed by the overflying party. The observed party can argue or debate which route to the locations might be best, if poor weather is expected, or if cloud cover will hamper the trip, they can propose alternate routes or sites. Ultimately, the overflying party can refuse the options and insist on the flight plan they want, and if the overflown party objects, they need to cancel the whole trip, with causses a major international incident.  But, there are some things that are constant on these flight plans (from studying past flight plans); steady speed and constant height are tell-tale signs of photos being taken. When the flight plan is agreed to, there are legs, and for each leg an altitude is selected which will place the camera at the correct distance from the ground to get 30cm imagery.  Same with speed; they want the speed of the aircraft to be consistant. Usually the height is between 8000-12000ft and the speed between 300-350kts.  On the maps I've marked potential sites in the right speed envelope in green (based on my best estimate). If the plane is doing 500kts, they aren't taking pictures. If they're at 34,000ft, they aren't taking pictures either. If they're at 8,000ft, and doing 300kts, you can bet they're taking pictures, or are lining up for the shot.
• American military or defence installations are sometimes pretty easy to spot along the line, especially if they're extremely remote.  If in the middle of a desert there's a runway, some fiel tanks, and some buildings... congratulations you've found some semi-secret remote military industrial complex test site, or where they keep the aliens; you get the idea.  If the speed of the plane is between 300-350, and the height is stable, that's the sweet spot, and you know there is either something there, something was there previously, or they thought something could be there, and wanted a closer look.
• Open Street Maps makes it easy to spot government facilities, as they're usually large pink sections of the map. Have a look at https://www.openstreetmap.org/ if you're struggling to name a site, and you might find it spelled out to you.

This is an Open Skies (OS) Format 14 document, submitted to the Canadian RCAF by the Russian RuAF at the conclusion of one of their Open Skies Treaty flights over Canada.



As I've pointed out previously, there is absolutely no reason any American reading this couldn't request (via FOIA) from the USAF, State Department, or DTRA, ALL the flight plans documented on Open Skies Format 14 templates (like the above) from 2002 to present day.
That will tell you exactly what legs were flown, and where the pictures were taken.

So what are you waiting for?

Russian Observation flights over the United States, again. (May 18-19 2017)

I've written a lot about the Open Skies Treaty (here), and this week the Russian Federation Open Skies Treaty certified Tu-154M is once again in the skies over the United States.  There has been less media coverage this time, perhaps because the media didn't realize these flights normally happen once every month or two, and over cycled just weeks ago.  In short, 34 nations are signatory to the treaty, that lets the signatories overfly each others territory, with short notice, and members of the overflown nation's military on board, to take 30cm resolution pictures of sites of interest.  30cm is the defined maximum image resolution, and was the same when the Russian's used wet film.  The rest of the countries still use wet film, so far. This time, the Russians flew into Travis AFB on the West Coast, after stops for fuel in Iceland and Canada, and started observation flights Thursday March 18th 2017.  The flight plan would have been tabled either late Monday or early Tuesday, and a memo to all US Military (and related to military) sites that were going to be overflown would have been sent to ensure all unicorns were in their stables, and all stolen alien technology was back underground at Area 51, or, you know, whatever.

Here is a quick and dirty map of the locations they overflew. Why? Well, think of it this way. The sites that the RuAF are taking pictures of have been requested by the Russian Intelligence Community.  Something at these sites is interesting to someone, likely in the Russian defence industry.  But don't they have Google Maps?  Yes, but Google Maps / Bing / Nokia are all routinely tampered with by "Agencies", and the services are happy to do so to keep on governments' good sides. Entire airports can be removed and farms photo-shopped in. Buildings are over-exposed to blot out what's on top. Facilities are entirely pixelated.  Imagery is overtly tampered with, shadows moved, objects cloned. What you see on Google Maps is what the government is allowing you to see; Russia knows that.  While 30cm resolution isn't the greatest commercially available, it is good enough to show tanks loaded on rail cars, new buildings that have cropped up out of nowhere, etc.. They know their camera, and the pictures it takes, have not been tampered with.

Using its new-last-year Digital Electro Optical sensor, the flight has been basing itself out of Travis AFB in California, and at the end of the first day of observation flights, I believe it has taken pictures of the following locations, based on the altitude and airspeed.  Looking at the map below, and where you see a red dot, the plane was between 290-310kn, the sweet spot to take pictures.

• NAS Lemoore
• Naval Weapons Station Concord
• Military Ocean Terminal Corcord
• Naval Air Station Alameda
• CGS Oakland
• Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories
• San Jose International Airport (SJC)
• The hills east of Hollister / San Benito County, California.
• (this list is incomplete)

Friday May 19th was the 2nd day of overflights and the Russians plotted a very similar route to what they flew in September of 2016.  Unfortunately, they varied their speed more than May 18th so it was a little harder to nail down exactly what they were taking pictures of.  My educated guesses are below:

• Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms
• Helendale Radar Cross Section Facility (Lockheed Martin)
• USAF Plant 42
• Edwards AFB
• Edwards AFB Aux North Site
• Tejon Ranch Radar Cross Section Facility
• NAWS China Lake
• Etcheron Valley Radar Cross-Section Measurement Facility
• Nellis AFB
• Creech AFB
• Nevada Test Site
• Beale AFB
• (this list is incomplete)

With two observation flights complete, the Russians flew the first leg of their trip back to Moscow on May 20th, stopping for an overnight stay in Canada at CFB Trenton, which is a treaty approved refuelling stop.  All countries which are signatory to the Treaty on Open Skies must provide logistical support to Open Skies Treaty transit flights.

Russian Open Skies Observation Mission Over USA (April 13-14 2017)

April 13-14th 2017 the Russian Federation conducted an overflight of the United States in compliance with the Open Skies Treaty, with members of the USAF on board.

You will notice the sites along the Eastern Seaboard are all at locations where the Russian Navy AGI Viktor Leonov AGI spotted in February and March.  Coincidence? Absolutely not.  The Viktor Leonov's mission is to profile subs, investigate coastal radar, sonar, subsurface sensors, etc. The Open Skies Observation flight was more than likely to check out the same sites it was performing ELINT on, to "see" from above the interesting things it picked up while it was at least 12 nautical miles from shore.

Russian Bombers are not threatening the United States. Stop the madness.

Russian Air Force Tu-95 Bear (unknown variant)
Photo Credit: Unknown

Since Donald J Trump won the American election there has been a suspicion that he did so with the help of, and in collusion with, the Russian government.  There has been a concerted information operation by a group opposed to his presidency to overthrow him by all means necessary with an unknown amount of support from within the government (also referred to as "The Deep State").  Part of the psychological operations (psyops) that this group is using to influence public opinion, and depose Donald Trump, seem to involve keeping their base paranoid and afraid; fear of anything Russian specifically. This didn't start with Donald Trump's presidency, it was already underway throughout the election campaign of Hillary Clinton.  The narrative changes over time, as facts change, but essentially Donald Trump is alleged to be some sort of puppet to Vladimir Putin, Putin has blackmail-able info on Trump, Russia has taken over the US with a bloodless coup, all decisions of the White House are somehow related to Putin, anyone opposed to this view is an agent of the Kremlin, supporting a revolution in the Democratic Party led by progressives like Bernie Sanders is juvenile and subversive, anything related to Russia is related to the election no matter how far removed, and anything that goes wrong in America, or the world, is Russia's fault.

I don't think I've even covered the half of it, but you hopefully get the idea that I'm thoroughly sick of people distorting facts regarding military deployments for political reasons and relating everything back to The Orange Menace.

DO YOU MEAN YOU DON'T BELIEVE PUTIN HELPED TRUMP? KREMLIN TROLL!

I want those people to STFU and impeach Donald Trump and stop filling Twitter with useless bullshit about how he's about to be deposed next week, two days from now, any day now, oh yes, there are papers being filed, next week, they have proof, just a couple more days, there's a dossier, there's a tape, there's evidence, there are people that said he said they said...
SHUT THE FUCK UP AND IMPEACH HIM ALREADY.
</rant>

The impact of this paranoid insistence that everything is related to Russia is poisoning the news media and having a significant influence on peoples' view of the world. Military operations that are routine and unrelated are now malicious and suspicious.

There were Russian Air Force planes in international airspace off Alaska on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday last week, with reports containing varying levels of detail, with varying levels of reliability, published by all the major, and not so major, news outlets.

WHY ARE YOU SO SKEPTICAL?! KREMLIN TROLL! KREMLIN TROLL!

NORAD has not been forthright in publishing information about incursions by Russian Air Force planes into the American Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) ever; in fact, they hardly ever do, but NORAD will tell you a year or two later how many times Russian planes were in the ADIZ previous years.  Let me repeat that because it doesn't make sense.
Russians routinely fly in the ADIZ, and NORAD regularly sends interceptors, or not, depending on their assessment of the situation, but NORAD doesn't usually tell the public about it.  I presume because it's not going to affect anyone's day and they don't want the media to put their political spin on routine military operations.  Well guess what? The media has the story now and it's a gong show of armchair analysis and all the usual varied political actors and pundits have piled on. Oh joy, let the speculation run wild with very few facts.

BUT RUSSIA IS SENDING A MESSAGE TO TRUMP THAT...

No, they're not. The message is the public are totally unaware of what's going on if they can't witness the event. No civilians witnessed the event, and therefore cannot give an independent view of the events. All the information about these Russian flights comes from the American Military, Canadian Military, or NORAD public affairs. They control the message, and their message cannot be fact-checked further than what is admitted to, and what the Russians admit to; when there are disagreements it is seen as unpatriotic to question western sources. Independent confirmation doesn't exist.  I'm not saying there weren't planes off the coast of Alaska, I'm pointing out you can't fact-check any of the information provided.  My biggest issue is the news media, the journalists, add a layer of distrust to the facts.  A reporter stated the planes Tuesday were the Tu-95H variety.  While interesting, it's also incorrect; they meant the "Bear H" which is a Tu-95MS. Close, but not quite correct.  Details like this make a difference, especially regarding range, capability, age, where they're based, etc.  and since NORAD isn't issuing press releases, we have to trust the media transcribed the information correctly, which isn't always the case.
I would really prefer NORAD issued statements after every incursion into the ADIZ full of all the information we would ever want, but I know that would be a lot of work for them, so I'm not expecting anything to change.

TRUMP HASN'T SAID ANYTHING - PROOF HE'S PUTIN'S PUPPET!

The constant demand for Trump to make public statements about anything is horrendously disingenuous and incredibly stupid.  Stop asking that he open his yap for anything more than eating and drinking.  Every time he makes a statement he risks an international incident or tanking the stock market.

BUT RUSSIAN BOMBERS ARE FLYING OVER ALASKA!

By Federal Aviation Administration
Public Domain

No, they're not.  Russian planes, some of them "bombers" (but with little detail to fact-check this), flew in international airspace within an area that the American Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). It's the area where, by the time a plane is flying towards the US, the military wants to get up in the air and figure out what's going on, if it's unexpected. The Russians doing this type of flight is routine, as in, it is performed a dozen times a year, but NORAD doesn't announce them, or retroactively when they were conducted.  If a dozen flights happened, one might assume they were spread out to have one every month. But NORAD didn't make that sort of a statement, and wouldn't nail down (they were asked by a journalist) when these approaches happened.  They always quote the yearly number, never a monthly number, which supports the idea that there are seasons to the training, ebb and flow.  What if every spring there is a flurry of air activity off Alaska?  What if that last increase in action was last spring, and NORAD didn't mention it to anyone because of the election cycle?
Oh, you want proof of that? Here you go:
"The incident was the first Russian bomber incursion of a U.S. or Canadian air defense zone this year. Officials said it likely signals the start of Russia’s long-range aviation spring training cycle. Further aerial incursions are expected." Bill Gertz, May 1, 2015
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-conducts-nuclear-bomber-flight-near-alaska/
Notice when it was published? MAY 2015.
It's now the end of APRIL 2017.
The timing of last week's incidents supports the idea this is a normal yearly seasonal training cycle, AND NOT RELATED TO DONALD TRUMP.

THE LAST TIME BOMBERS FLEW NEAR THE COAST WAS JULY 4TH 2015!

By Department of Defense - Printed publication
IFR Supplement - United States., Public Domain

Bullshit. If this has any truth to it, it's playing word games off the different ADIZ zones; the Alaska ADIZ is not the same as the West Coast ADIZ, and in July 2015 the bombers said Hello off the California coast.  Maybe it is rare for the flights to be off California? So it's true, but in context trying to give the impression these most recent incursions into the ADIZ are abnormal, when they aren't? I don't know where the idea came from, it's not unusual for the planes to be in the ADIZ.

"Alaska's ADIZ averages about 10 incursions by Russian aircraft a year. The number is "growing slightly," according to Alaska NORAD officials, who characterized the Russian flights as non-provocative training missions." -Alaska Daily News, March 3rd, 2014
https://www.adn.com/military/article/russian-military-increasing-capabilities-overflights-near-alaska-airspace/2015/03/14/




TBD

I'll add more later, this is just a stub.

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-11-012; Russia over Canada in 2011

 Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
 Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

Indeed this is becoming repetitive, but here we have the 2011 Flight Plan for the Russian Open Skies treaty overflight of Canada.  Clearly this time the focus was on hitting all of the West Coast locations with any military interest.  The data I was provided from DND looked like it was printed, scanned, printed, scanned again, and altered in various programs along the way; so while legible to the human eye, it is causing problems with my OCR software.  If any of the data points aren't exactly where they should be, I apologize, but that's as good as it gets!

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-12-018; Russia over Canada in 2012

Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

I'm working backwards through the flight plans and mission reports of Russian overflights of Canada under the Open Skies Treaty, and I am noticing some similarities and trends.  Since they only have ~5000-6000km according to the treaty to use in one mission, they can't visit every since military facility; but they make a really good effort.  The Russians have a few favourite locations they like to visit as often as possible; CFAD Dundurn and CFB Suffield are two of those locations.  Former Pinetree Line Long Range Radar Stations are favourites; after all, why would we decommission them and not build something in the same spot?  Any and all military bases are obvious targets of areal photography as well; Cold Lake, Kingston, Borden (w/ CFAD Angus), etc...

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-13-020; Russia over Canada in 2013

Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

As a follow-on to my previous post and the one before that on Open Skies Treaty overflights of Canada, here are the 2013 coordinates where cameras were engaged and disengaged, and flight paths.  This mission was performed between 2013-06-15 and 2013-06-20.

Click the square bracketed icon at the top right of the map to blow it up full-screen so you can read it better.

Open Skies Treaty overflight OS-14-032; Russia over Canada in 2014

Russian Open Skies Tu-154M-Lk-1
Ottawa International Airport on 2013-10-27
Photo Credit: Colin Elliott

As I mentioned previously, I requested, via Access to Information, from DND, all the flight plans performed under the Open Skies Treaty which were flown over Canada by the Russians until 2014 - and somehow got them!  So now I'm looking to find out what the Russians thought would be so important hat they would spend ~$150,000 to fly over here, shack up in some of our finest rural hotels, and buzz around Canada taking pictures of our great country.  Of course everyone would love to spend a week flying over Canada and getting away from it all, but their choice of things to photograph is sometimes a little odd.  The Diefenbunker?  Really?

I'm looking for you to identify some of the less obvious legs of the trip.  along the flight plan you'll see "START" and "STOP"; this is where the photos started to be taken, and stopped being taken.  If they weren't shooting photos at the time, they were travelling to the next leg where more photos would be taken; pretty simple.  It is plain to see they took photos of former Pinetree Line Radar sites (such as Alsask) and the former CFB Carp; but some of the other areas are a mystery to me.

Do you see anything interesting?

(Click the Maximize square at the top right corner of the map to go full screen)

In February 2016 Turkey grievously violated the Open Skies Treaty, and nobody cared.

Russian Antonov An-30 Open Skies Plane
© Flickr/ Dmitry Terekhov

I've been boring people with talk about the Open Skies Treaty for months, but what really shocked and disappointed me was the complete lack of international reaction when treaty-signatory member Turkey seriously violated the treaty; nothing publicly came of it, at all.  No public protests from the US, Canada, or any other members; just Russia, who was the signatory member who was trying to do the overflight of Turkey to begin with.

Let me explain with an example; when any nation who is signatory to the Open Skies Treaty proposes to fly over the United States, they table a flight plan on day 1, as soon as they arrive.  The US representatives review that flight plan and consider what they want to overfly, and let the military units along that route know to cover up their super-top-secret stuff because an observation flight is immanent.  But... They do have the option to send the Russians home if a "High Value Activity" would be exposed, and cannot be avoided.  It is the last possible option, and absolutely the least desirable.

Let me bring your attention to:

Air Force Manual 16-604 - Oct 2009
Implementation Of, And Compliance With, The Treaty on Open Skies
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afman16-604.pdf

Specifically what the USAF calls a "High Value Activity" (HVA); the only reason given in the USAF manual to scrub an entire Open Skies Treaty flight.

6.3.2. In general, an HVA is an activity that:
6.3.2.1. Will incur substantial monetary cost if postponed or cancelled,
6.3.2.2. Cannot be concealed and reveals national security information if observed,
6.3.2.3. Takes advantage of a unique set of chronological or meteorological circumstances which cannot be duplicated, or
6.3.2.4. The command/agency believes special circumstances apply

Meaning, if a Russia requests an overflight, and a flight plan tabled, for an overflight of the United States, and some "high value activity" is going on, they might refuse the whole flight.  Take for an example a satellite launch that has a short window of opportunity; they can't have a Russian Open Skies plane flying over a rocket launch site; not for "national security" reasons, but practical reasons - they don't want to accidentally hit the Russian plane.  Alternatively, an HVA could be a scheduled test of a new military technology that they don't want the Russians to see, and can't be hidden or the time of the test changed for some reason.

The manual goes on to say...

6.3.5. With each HVA Report, the unit/MAJCOM must indicate their recommendation associated with this HVA.
6.3.5.1. If the HVA can be deconflicted, the recommendation would likely be to report the HVA for information only.
6.3.5.2. If the unit’s preference is to seek to negotiate around the event, negotiating guidance will be given to the DTRA Escort Team Chief.
6.3.5.3. If the recommendation is to avoid the HVA, then the reporting unit will need to provide the name and immediate contact information for the senior flag officer supporting the HVA. This recommendation is a recommendation to violate a legally binding international treaty. This scenario is serious and will involve guidance from the HVAG or higher.

To summarise, if there is something that can't be moved or deconflicted, like a super-secret item out in the open that can't be hidden and would cause embarrassment or compromise national security if photographed, the military has the option to scrub the whole Open Skies overflight, if they can't negotiate their way out of it with the overflying nation.  They know that's the absolute worst case, since it would "violate a legally binding international treaty".  The last thing the US Military wants to do is put itself into a front-page news conflict about covering up some secret activity it was trying to hide in the first place; it is absolutely the last recourse to cancel the entire overflight.

But, that's exactly what Turkey did.  Obviously Turkey has their own playbook, and I don't have the Turkey Open Skies field manual, but I bet as a fellow NATO member they don't want to be front page treaty-violation news either.  Conveniently, Western media gave them a pass on the whole ordeal, likely because nobody understood what was going on, because the US, as a matter of policy, doesn't publicise or talk about the Open Skies Treaty unless asked directly.  It says so in the Air Force manual.

Russia provided one week of notice of its intent to overfly Turkey between February 1st and February 5th 2016.  Russia conducted its previous overflight in in December, shortly after the Turks shot down a Russian fighter bomber under contentious circumstances; you'd think their relationship would have been at it's worst, but the overflight went ahead anyway.  Upon the Russians' arrival in February, just like every other time, the Russians tabled a flight plan.  This time, Turkey and Russia could not agree on a flight plan; meaning Russia wanted to overfly something specific, and Turkey said no.  The only way out of that impasse, is for Turkey to contravene the treaty entirely, and send the Russians home.  I conclude they must have hit an HVA situation, as is outlined in the USAF manual under 6.3.5.3.  I don't know what other reason they could have.  The question, of course, is what was it that was a HVA that the Russians wanted to overfly?  The proposed flight plan was not released by either the Russians or the Turks.  The flight plan is unclassified (not Secret or Top Secret), and nowhere in the treaty are signatory nations barred from being released; it can be made public if they want to make it so.  I sent requests to the Russian MFA, Russian Embassy in Canada and Russian OSCE via Twitter - with no response (nor did I expect to hear anything back, but hey, why not try?)

I think it's quite possible, since Turkey is hosting American and other NATO forces, that coalition forces that were not publically disclosed ( like... a drone base, a foreign Special Forces base, deployed Electronic Warfare equipment, foreign artillery, foreign MLRS, etc.. ) could have been dug in along the flight route, and the Turks (or foreign nation (Americans?)) did not want their forces photographed, as they were not disclosing to their citizens they had those forces in place.  If we go with the narrative the Russians are pushing in their media, the overflight was scrubbed to hide Turkish cooperation with IS/ISIL/ISIS/Daesh forces smuggling arms and oil across the border.
The Turkish statement (quoted below) to the media says that in December 2015 (right after the Russian fighter-bomber was shot down) the Russian Open Skies flight plan was approved and flown with the modifications to the flight plan; these changes were proposed by the Turks and agreed to by the Russians.  So why couldn't they negotiate through this flight plan?

None of this Russian-Turkish Open Skies hubbub was picked up on by the Western media.
No analysis or in depth reporting was done.
Why is that?

Here is the official statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tanju Bilgiç, regarding the failed Russian Open Skies Treaty flight:

"QA-4, 4 

February 2016, Statement of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Tanju Bilgiç In Response to a Question Concerning the Open Skies Treaty Observation Flight over Turkey that could not be conducted by the Russian Federation
The Treaty on Open Skies, envisaged as a confidence and security building measure in the OSCE geography, was opened for signature in 1992. Currently 34 states, including Turkey are parties to the Treaty. The Treaty establishes a regime that permits States Parties to conduct aerial observation flights over the territories of other States Parties in accordance with distributed quotas.
Observation flights are performed when the observing Party and the observed Party reach agreement on the mission plan. In the case of the observation flight requested by the Russian Federation for 2-5 February 2016, agreement could not be reached on the mission plan and the flight has thus not been conducted.
The limitations imposed by the Russian Federation on observation flights over its own territory is already known by all States Parties to the said Treaty. On the other hand, the observation flight of the Russian Federation in Turkey in December 2015, was conducted on the basis of mission plan changes as suggested by Turkey." (ref here)

That statement says pretty much nothing.  The Russian "restrictions" placed on Open Skies flights over Russia do not prohibit overflights, and have nothing to do with this overflight anyway.

Russian MoD Statement:

http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12076588@egNews

Quotes:

"First of all, it is to be reminded that the Russian Federation was to have conducted an observation flight over the territory of the Turkish Republic on February 1-5, 2016 in accordance with the Treaty on Open Skies. A preliminary approval for the flight had been received from the Turkish party within the time limits prescribed by the Treaty."

Meaning Russia gave Turkey seven days notice that they would be conducting an overflight, and Turkey agreed, which is normal.

"Yesterday a group of Russian observers arrived at the Turkish airport Eskisehir and submitted the route of the observation flight to Turkish representatives as it’s required under the Treaty."

This shows the Russian flight crew, and treaty-allowed plane, with appropriate sensor suite, arrived and proposed their flight plan and mission plan.  Nothing unusual.

"However, the Turkish Defense Ministry officials refused the Russian specialists to perform the observation flight over the areas adjacent to Syria, as well as over the airfields with concentrations of NATO aviation and without any specific explanation at that."

So it goes pear-shaped at this point; Turkish officials had 4 hours to negotiate and agree to a flight plan with the Russians, but they didn't like something in the flight plan, and said no - or proposed changes to go around the area of interest that the Russians didn't agree to, effectively saying no.  Russian sources have stated that the Turks haven't wanted overflights near Patriot missile batteries along the border with Syria, and at the air bases where coalition planes are operating from.  Maybe there are aircraft that are deployed to the coalition airbases that nobody has admitted to, but I can't imagine what sort of planes those would be.  Heavy strategic bombers?  Undisclosed attack helicopters?  An uptick in USAF C-17 transport aircraft landing in Turkey was noticed by plane watching enthusiasts around the same time.  Was this related?

Interestingly (to me) the Incirlik Air Base houses American and Turkish B-61 nuclear bombs.  Maybe the Russians wanted to have a look at the readiness of the hangers which have the B-61 bombs hidden underneath in vaults?
Maybe nuclear-capable fighters are already positioned in those hangers?
Could there be nuclear saber rattling going on that neither side wants to admit to in public?

I'm sure they won't tell us the real reason the Turkish Open Skies flight was denied in February 2016, but it would be nice to have a better idea of what is really going on.

TASS news stories on the Turkish refusal to grant the overflight
(which are arguably official statements from the Russian side)

Feb 2, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/defense/853806
Feb 3, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/defense/854345
Feb 4, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/world/854458
Feb 4, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/politics/854677
Feb 5, 2016    http://tass.ru/en/politics/854715
Feb 19, 2016  http://tass.ru/en/politics/858021

I believe this is the most notable event in the Open Skies world this year.

Why?

Because Syria is at war, they are a Russian ally, with Russian and Iranian troops on the ground, in Syria.  Rumours of Turkey preparing for a ground invasion of Syria had been floating around for months.  Turkey has been meddling with cross border affairs, including incursions into Syrian territory by armoured units, and shelling villages inside Syria from Turkey.  Doing an overflight of their border region to make sure they are not amassing an army to cross the border is *exactly* what the Open Skies Treaty was written for; but it was blocked easily, and without any significant media coverage.

How can that be?