Tracking US Navy nuclear submarines using publicly available information

US Navy official photo (exact credit unknown)

US Navy official web page (Screenshot 2017-06-09)

(2018-12-16 Edit) The purpose of the secrecy around the locations of US Navy SSNs, SSGNs, and SSBNs is operational security; OPSEC.  You don't want to tell an adversary where the submarines are, so you don't jeopardize their mission.  The safety of those submarines, and their submariners, is of paramount importance to everyone. My objective in highlighting the following is to raise awareness that the supposed secrecy surrounding those deployments does not to hide their area of deployment from the Chinese Navy, North Korean Navy, or the Russian Navy; it hides or obfuscates their deployments from the collective knowledge of the American people, who happen to pay for the US Navy though their taxes. The technique I'm going to show you suggests that they are not hiding, and know it. I speculate they are not spoken openly about for political, rather than OPSEC, reasons.

The US Navy themselves post to official US Navy web pages and social media about US Navy submarine deployments; the screenshots embedded are proof of that, in case you hadn't noticed these posts before, or are not following the US Navy on social media.  Unlike the leaks to Fox News from Pentagon sources and other news organisations around the positions of the Russian Navy AGI Viktor Leonov, which were derived from US Navy intelligence sources and clearly Secret, if not Top Secret, these are public displays of the US Navy's ability to project power to the other side of the globe. The transponders being on, and the press releases, are all shows of force.

US Navy official Twitter account (posted 2017-06-07)

I do not want anyone to think the transponders on these subs are being used naively or in any incompetent fashion by the US Navy, or they're "forgetting" that they turn them on and off; all of this is extremely well known by the commanding officer of the submarine and the rest of the crew. The decisions related to who to tell or not tell in the public sphere are solely made at the Pentagon.  Submarines are stealthy by nature, and have the capability to remain hidden for an extended trip into hostile waters; that these submarines are turning up on AIS indicates the US Navy feels it doesn't have to hide these particular submarines at these specific times.  You'll notice very few SSBN "Boomers" on the list, since they do not show up very often at all; their areas of operation are more secret than the attack submarines. I presume this difference is directly related to their vital role in the nuclear triad; they must stay hidden.  This difference again demonstrates it isn't that the US Navy can't keep a secret, SSN deployments just aren't universally as secret as they may seem to be.

locations where US Navy submarines have last beaconed using AIS-T
(screenshot 2017-06-09 MarineTraffic.com)

Much like the NORAD interceptions of Russian Long Range Aviation flights, or Russian Open Skies Treaty overflights of the United States, the military is under no obligation to share information about these operations with the public, and by policy doesn't.  NORAD does not announce when they intercept Russian Long Range Aviation flights; the only time you hear them on the news is when information is leaked by someone (read: officials at the Pentagon). The USAF doesn't announce when Russian Open Skies Treaty overflights are going on.  Those flights are not secret, as evidenced by their transponders being on, and as they are announced in advance in the Russian news media.  Again, the silence is political.

The following spreadsheet should help you match the Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI), which the submarine transponder identifies itself as, with the true name of the submarine. They usually identify themselves with a generic name like "submarine" or "us submarine"; with a little data aggregation we can fix that.  Special thanks to @lala_zet (どうもありがとうございました) who posted their MMSI / name correlations as well. The MMSI-name correlations I didn't have, I copied, and the ones I had previously, I was able to confirm.

Some of the below, but not all, can be tracked on MarineTraffic.com, if this interests you. The corresponding MMSIs can only be considered "best-guess" in terms of accuracy.


USS Henry M. Jackson (SSBN-730) MMSI:
USS Alabama (SSBN-731) MMSI:
USS Alaska (SSBN-732) MMSI:
USS Nevada (SSBN-733) MMSI:
USS Tennessee (SSBN-734) MMSI:
USS Pennsylvania (SSBN-735) MMSI:
USS West Virginia (SSBN-736) MMSI:
USS Kentucky (SSBN-737) MMSI:
USS Maryland (SSBN-738) MMSI:
USS Nebraska (SSBN-739) MMSI:
USS Rhode Island (SSBN-740) MMSI:369970218
USS Maine (SSBN-741) MMSI:
USS Wyoming (SSBN-742) MMSI:369970231
USS Louisiana (SSBN-743) MMSI:369970198
USS Ohio (SSGN-726) MMSI:
USS Michigan (SSGN-727) MMSI:369970203
USS Florida (SSGN-728) MMSI:369970157
USS Georgia (SSGN-729) MMSI:369970181
USS Seawolf (SSN-21) MMSI:
USS Connecticut (SSN-22) MMSI:369970178
USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) MMSI:369970192
USS Bremerton (SSN-698) MMSI:369970170
USS Jacksonville (SSN-699) MMSI:
USS Buffalo (SSN-715) MMSI:
USS Olympia (SSN-717) MMSI:369970212
USS Providence (SSN-719) MMSI:369970008
USS Pittsburgh (SSN-720) MMSI:369970216
USS Chicago (SSN-721) MMSI:
USS Key West (SSN-722) MMSI:366874512
USS Oklahoma City (SSN-723) MMSI:369970211
USS Louisville (SSN-724) MMSI:
USS Helena (SSN-725) MMSI:369970185
USS Newport News (SSN-750) MMSI:369970208
USS San Juan (SSN-751) MMSI:369970217
USS Pasadena (SSN-752) MMSI:369970213
USS Albany (SSN-753) MMSI:369970163
USS Topeka (SSN-754) MMSI:369970227
USS Scranton (SSN-756) MMSI:369970221
USS Alexandria (SSN-757) MMSI:369970165
USS Asheville (SSN-758) MMSI:
USS Jefferson City (SSN-759) MMSI:
USS Annapolis (SSN-760) MMSI:369970166
USS Springfield (SSN-761) MMSI:369970223
USS Columbus (SSN-762) MMSI:369970177
USS Santa Fe (SSN-763) MMSI:369970220
USS Boise (SSN-764) MMSI:369970169
USS Montpelier (SSN-765) MMSI:
USS Charlotte (SSN-766) MMSI:369970172
USS Hampton (SSN-767) MMSI:369970183
USS Hartford (SSN-768) MMSI:369970184
USS Toledo (SSN-769) MMSI:369970226
USS Tucson (SSN-770) MMSI:369970228
USS Columbia (SSN-771) MMSI:369970176
USS Greeneville (SSN-772) MMSI:369970182
USS Cheyenne (SSN-773) MMSI:369970173
USS Virginia (SSN-774) MMSI:369970229
USS Texas (SSN-775) MMSI:369970225
USS Hawaii (SSN-776) MMSI:369970158
USS North Carolina (SSN-777) MMSI:369970159
USS New Hampshire (SSN-778) MMSI:
USS New Mexico (SSN-779) MMSI:369970012
USS Missouri (SSN-780) MMSI:368926259
USS California (SSN-781) MMSI:369970327
USS Mississippi (SSN-782) MMSI:369970328
USS Minnesota (SSN-783) MMSI:369970641
USS North Dakota (SSN-784) MMSI:369970642
USS John Warner (SSN-785) MMSI:369970640
USS Illinois (SSN-786) MMSI:369970957
USS Washington (SSN-787) MMSI:369970958
USS Colorado (SSN-788) MMSI:369970201
USS Indiana (SSN-789) MMSI:369970960
USS South Dakota (SSN-790) MMSI:368926327

(2018-12-16 Edit)

Anon. French military source says Russian SSBN was detected off the French coast

On March 10th Vincent Jauvert, a reporter for L'Obs, a French news organisation, broke the story that a Russian SSBN was detected off the coast of France, in international waters, in January 2016.  The source was an anonymous French defence official.

Original here:

http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20160310.OBS6146/info-obs-un-sous-marin-nucleaire-russe-repere-dans-le-golfe-de-gascogne.html

If you're not too savvy with the French language, here is the Reuters story that followed:

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-submarine-france-idUSKCN0WC23T

J E Dyer is an expert in all things Navy, especially underwater intelligence, and provides an extremely well written in-depth analysis regarding the potential strategic advantage of positioning an SSBN there; her blog post is here:

http://libertyunyielding.com/2016/03/11/whoa-russia-sends-major-signal-with-nuclear-armed-sub-off-france/

Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institute (full bio here) provides his thorough analysis regarding the potential messaging being delivered by Russia here:

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/14-russian-submarine-france-pifer

I'd like to back up at this point and ask some questions.  This discussion is all based on one anonymous French defence official who leaked information to the media that cannot be confirmed or denied independently or by any official source; why is it we think this claim is true?  

This leaked intelligence, of a Russian Sub being detected off the coast of France in January, would be at least Secret or Top Secret information, and if it wasn't leaked through official channels, should provoke an investigation by the French military to find the person who leaked the information.  I didn't hear any suggestion of anything like that in any media yet.

I'm very sceptical of unconfirmed leaked information that could be used to bolster the US Military / Navy budget. There are several angles to this story that are strange and have not been investigated. Why should we believe an anonymous source with a suspicious story that plays into the US Navy "red scare" narrative that could be used to increase funding for missile defense, or other military programs?

We have no way to ascertain the validity of the source or details of the story.

Did the French positively identify the type of submarine beyond it being an SSBN? If so, how? Acoustically? Magnetically? What margin of error was there for the determination? Did the French have a submarine in pursuit? Surface vessel tracking it for a while? Since no official source is going to talk about this, it's impossible to determine to what degree of certainty the type of vessel was identified. I've been told that accurate identification is possible with current military sensors, but we have no way to tell what sensors were used, and to what accuracy the identification was made.

The source did not identify exactly what type of submarine was spotted; just that it was an SSBN. There are multiple types of SSBNs in the Russian Navy, so which one was it? How did they determine it wasn't an SSGN if they didn't determine what type of SSBN it was? There is a Russian project where SSBNs are modified (lengthened) into "motherships" to ferry mini-subs to underwater cables. Does a acoustic or magnetic signature of a Delta IV SSBN and Delta IV "Stretch" (mothership) sound similar? Could they be mistaken for one another?

Russian Navy Delta IV SSBN Submarine
(Image Credit: Unknown)

A Delta IV "Stretch" (or other "stretch" variant) might make a lot more sense in this scenario. Undersea cables seem to be of interest to the Russian Navy lately. A "Stretch" variant could ferry a mini-sub outfitted with special equipment to tap underwater cables. This would mean no "messaging" or "nuclear saber rattling" was being performed, it was simply an underwater reconnaissance operation to tap undersea cables that was spotted.  Such "mothership" submarines are also part of the Northern Fleet, located near Murmansk at Olenya Guba (Оле́нья Губа), part of the 29th Special Squadron. Does that ring any bells?  Perhaps completely by coincidence, that's where the RV Yantar, the new research vessel, is also based. (previous blog posts about her here)

Russian Navy Delta IV "Stretch"
(Image Credit: Globalsecurity.org)

Tapping undersea cables isn't as sexy a story as nuclear saber rattling, and potentially wouldn't give the same "boost" to the US Navy's budget in the manner they want. Stating publicly that the Russians can go anywhere in international waters and tap cables would also raise a lot of questions about the safety of the Internet infrastructure that the governments of the world are likely ill-equipped to answer. Yes, undersea cables can be compromised. No, your government can't stop them.  Yes, other governments are doing the same thing.

The Remains of the Pavlovskoye (Па́вловское) Submarine Base

While looking for something rather unrelated I found a fantastic place on the other side of the planet to perform some Urban Exploration (Urbex).  An abandoned Soviet underground submarine base / shelter.  I have absolutely no chance of actually doing any Urbex there myself, but if you're in the area, this is something extremely rare and should be checked out.  There were three Soviet Navy underground shelters / bases constructed to shield and protect ballistic missile submarines from a first strike, and hide them from prying eyes at the same time.  I have not found a lot of information on this facility but here is what I could come up with.

But first, it seems like there is some debate regarding why the facility was shut down.  Well, it was part of the first nuclear disarmament treaty, the START I treaty, back in 1991, signed by George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Here is precisely the paragraph where the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base was negotiated into closure.

U.S. STATEMENT ON UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES
July 29, 1991

Pavlovskoye Submarine Base (Date Unknown)

The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagelnaya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and
will not construct any such underground structures while the START Treaty remains in force. The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint. 

UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES ADJACENT TO WATERS IN WHICH BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES OPERATE
July 29, 1991

Pavlovskoye Submarine Base
Date Unknown / Source Unknown

Since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara inlet (Kola peninsula), the Yagelnaya submarine base (Kola peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye submarine base (Primorskiy kray), in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in order to settle the issue of these underground structures once and for all, the Soviet side states that these underground structures have no adits that make them accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement from adjacent waters and that the Soviet Union has no plans to construct and will not construct such adits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Effective verification of this shall be ensured by national technical means.
The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the United States of America does not have and will not construct similar underground structures as long as the Treaty remains in force. 

http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/declsts.html#42

From the Annexes of the START I treaty, the Pavlovskoye naval base had five (5) Delta I ballistic missile submarines and 60 SS-N-8 SLBMs deployed between them; an additional 85 SLBMs were in storage at the base.

SUBMARINE BASE:	PAVLOVSKOYE
	SLBM TYPE
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-18
DEPLOYED SLBMS	0	60	0
DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS OF SLBMS	0	60	0
NON-DEPLOYED SLBMS	55	14	16
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES BASED AT THIS SUBMARINE BASE:
NUMBER OF SUBMARINES/AGGREGATE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS BY SLBM TYPE:
SUBMARINE TYPE:
DELTA I		5/60
	NUMBER
STORAGE CRANES	0
MISSILE TENDERS	0

But you probably want to SEE the base, and not just hear about it.  Well, it seems that englishrussia.com has posted a series of pictures, a superset of what io9 posted, and both got the pictures from a blogger who's account is no longer in existance.  So, here they are!

Additional pictures here:
http://joemonster.org/art/34688
http://zeka-vasch.livejournal.com/1426354.html