Members of the American government and American military who seem opposed to the Open Skies Treaty have mentioned, in vague terms, Russian "violations" of the treaty during congressional hearings and quotes in the media (see here and here for context). So, since I couldn't find anyone in the media who was specifically outlining what those "violations were", I went looking for them. The most important question in my mind was, what are they, and are these violations major, or minor? Are these American officials using these violations as an excuse to throw the entire treaty under the bus and start a new Cold War, or worse, a nuclear winter.
Below you will find a link to the whole 2016 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments by the US Department of State's Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance - which covers events in CY 2015, a significant amount of which I've pasted below, and the rebuttal from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the violations the Americans have accused Russia of. You can draw your own conclusions; I'm not trying to spin this for any country, I want to encourage discussion. But why haven't media organisations published these statements in their entirety? Does it break the narrative being portrayed?
The whole State Department document can be found here. Skip down the page (way down) and you'll find my take on it. Compare that with what you read; see if we agree, or how we disagree. For a treaty that is this important, let's not just trust what we're being told. These are not insurmountable military riddles; you do not need to be a military expert of any sort to be informed. Here is the Open Skies section of the State Department report:
TREATY ON OPEN SKIES (OST)
The OST establishes a regime for the conduct of unarmed observation flights by States Parties over the territories of other States Parties using up to four types of sensors (optical panoramic and framing cameras, video cameras with real-time display, infra-red line-scanning devices, and sideways-looking synthetic aperture radar). The Treaty was signed at Helsinki on March 24, 1992. The Treaty entered into force on January 1, 2002, and is of unlimited duration. As of December 31, 2015, 34 States Parties have signed and ratified the OST.
In March and April 2015, the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) adopted five new Treaty decisions that update the provisions related to the Treaty’s transition from film to digital optical sensors. These decisions capped a year-long effort by the United States to provide procedures for bringing the next generation of optical Treaty sensors into use while addressing and mitigating the concerns of U.S. departments and agencies and other States Parties.
Belarus and Russia participate in the Treaty as the Belarus/Russian Federation Group of States Parties. The United States first began addressing compliance concerns for the Belarus/Russian Federation Group of States Parties in the 2004 Compliance Report. All OST compliance concerns for 2015 are related to Russia alone.
BELARUS/RUSSIAN FEDERATION GROUP OF STATES PARTIES (RUSSIA)
FINDING #1
Russia continues not to meet its treaty obligations to allow effective observation of its entire territory, raising serious compliance concerns under Article VI and VIII of the OST and OSCC Decision 3/04. Specifically, Russia has:
enforced a “maximum flight distance” of 500 kilometers for all flights over Kaliningrad since 2014; refused access in a ten-kilometer corridor along its border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2010; refused access in the Moscow region below 3,600 meters altitude in an area 39 kilometers by 31 kilometers, identified by Russian Air Traffic Control as UUP-53 since 2005, and below 5,100 meters altitude over Chechnya and nearby areas of southwestern Russia since 2002; and refused to provide air traffic control facilitation, including by improperly invoking force majeure, for certain OST flights since 2011.
CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
In 2014, Russia imposed a 500-kilometer limit for all observation flights over Kaliningrad, including flights that originate from the Kubinka airfield, which otherwise has a maximum flight distance of 5,500 kilometers. In July 2015, a joint Romania-United States mission proposed a flight plan of 772 kilometers over Kaliningrad, which was rejected by Russia. Russia also rejected similar flight plans of greater than 500 kilometers proposed by a Germany-Latvia mission in April 2015, a United Kingdom mission in June 2015, a Poland mission in July 2015, and a Canada-Spain mission in September 2015. The affected States Parties objected to these restrictions in the respective mission reports.
In July 2015, a joint Ukraine-United States mission proposed a flight plan within 10 kilometers of Russia’s border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Russia rejected. In August 2015, Russia rejected a similar flight plan during a Turkey mission.
In November 2015, Russia rejected the flight plan of a joint Canada-United States mission that proposed to transit UUP-53 at an altitude less than 3,600 meters, but at the certified altitude of the sensor. Russia imposed similar altitude restrictions over Chechnya in 2002 due to conflict in the area and purported safety-of-flight considerations; the restrictions remained in place through 2015.
Russia forced a United States mission to deviate from an agreed-upon flight plan in 2014 based upon an improper claim of force majeure because of assertions of very important person (VIP) movement concerns. A similar incident occurred during a United Kingdom flight in June 2015, though this issue did not affect the United States in 2015.
ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
Imposing a Sublimit of 500 Kilometers for Flights Over Kaliningrad. As provided for by Annex A, Section III, flights originating from the Kubinka Open Skies Airfield are subject to a maximum flight distance of 5,500 kilometers. No treaty provision allows a State Party to establish a sub-limit within the maximum flight distance of an established Open Skies Airfield, as Russia has done for missions originating from the Kubinka Open Skies Airfield for the territory of Kaliningrad. To the contrary, Subparagraph 1(b) of OSCC Decision 3/04 precludes a State Party from decreasing the maximum flight distance of an Open Skies Airfield. Relatedly, Subparagraph 1(a) of this decision requires that the coverage of the entire territory of a State Party shall be ensured in such a way so as not to increase the number of flights required for the opportunity to observe the entire territory of that State Party. U.S. experts have determined that 500 kilometers is insufficient to enable the United States to observe Kaliningrad in its entirety in one flight. Russia’s 500-kilometer limit on flights over Kaliningrad raises serious concerns about its adherence to OSCC Decision 3/04, a view that the majority of OST States Parties share.
Airspace Restrictions Along the Russia-Georgia Border. Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 2, prohibits flight within 10 kilometers of a border with a non-State Party. Russia claims the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia are independent states not party to the Treaty, and thus takes the position that Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 2, prohibits flight within ten kilometers of its border with those regions. However, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are within the internationally recognized borders of Georgia, and are considered by all other States Parties to be part of Georgia, which is party to the Treaty. Accordingly, in the U.S. view, there does not appear to be any basis within the Treaty to exclude observation flights from within ten kilometers of any portion of the Russia-Georgia border. Russia’s rejection of the U.S. flight plan raises serious concerns about Russia’s adherence to its obligations under Articles VI and VIII by denying States Parties the right to observe the territory along portions of its border with Georgia.
Altitude Restrictions Over/Near UUP-53 and Chechnya. Article VI, Section II, Paragraph 2, states that an observing Party’s mission plan “may provide for an observation flight that allows for the observation of any point on the entire territory of the observed Party, including areas designated by the observed Party as hazardous airspace ....” In addition, the Treaty permits an observing Party to obtain a ground resolution of no better than 30 centimeters for optical panoramic cameras, optical framing cameras, and video cameras. Due to the certified minimum altitudes at which U.S. sensors can obtain such resolution, Russian altitude restrictions prevent observation at 30-centimeter resolution of the UUP-53 area (in the Moscow region) and Chechnya by most U.S. sensor configurations. Four other States Parties are similarly affected by Russia’s altitude restrictions and four States Parties are unable to achieve maximum Treaty-permitted resolutions with any of their certified sensor configurations. The inability of these States Parties to observe parts of Russian territory effectively has a direct impact on the United States since approximately one-third of U.S. observation missions are conducted using other States Parties’ aircraft. Russia’s altitude restrictions raise serious concerns about Russia’s adherence to its obligations under Article VI.
Failure to Provide Air Traffic Control Facilitation. Article VI, Section I, Paragraph 15, states that the observed Party “shall ensure its air traffic control authorities facilitate the conduct of observation flights in accordance with this Treaty.” Once a flight plan is accepted by the observing and observed Parties, the Treaty does not provide for deviations from the flight plan unless “necessitated” by the scenarios specified in Article VIII, Section II, Paragraph 1, which include “air traffic control instructions related to circumstances brought about by force majeure.”
The term force majeure is not defined in the Treaty, but it is widely understood in international law to refer to a force or event beyond a State’s control. VIP movements are known in advance and are within the control of the government. Russia’s restrictions do not fit this description and therefore do not constitute force majeure. Russia’s practice of groundlessly invoking force majeure to justify deviations from accepted flight plans during negotiations or to force deviations of observation missions in flight raises serious concerns about Russia’s adherence to its obligations under Articles VI and VIII of the Treaty.
EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
The United States and other States Parties have raised these compliance concerns repeatedly in 2015 through OST notifications, statements in the OSCC – including at the Third Review Conference in June 2015 – and bilaterally with Russia in consultations at various levels. In the OSCC, the United States continued to oppose any airspace restriction inhibiting an observing Party’s right to observe any point on the observed Party’s territory in accordance with the Treaty. U.S. initiative placed the altitude and airspace concerns related to Russia’s implementation in the Informal Working Group on Rules and Procedures (IWGRP) of the OSCC, where the United States continues to lead the effort to reach solutions. The United States continues to consult with other States Parties that have altitude restrictions for a variety of reasons. Poland submitted a working paper to the OSCC co-sponsored by 15 States Parties, including the United States, which outlined the problems associated with Russia’s actions in Kaliningrad. This issue also remains on the agenda of the IWGRP. U.S. officials, as well as Allied representatives, continued to object to Russia’s groundless invocation of force majeure in connection with VIP movements in an effort to justify deviations from agreed-upon flight plans. In 2015, the United States began to discuss with other OST States Parties compliance concerns raised by Russia’s conduct. To date, these efforts have not resolved any of the compliance concerns.
FINDING #2
In 2015, Russia made clear that it would not allow Ukraine to conduct solo observation flights over its territory unless Ukraine paid for each flight in advance. As a result, Ukraine has been unable to conduct any solo flights over Russian territory during 2015. Although not involving an obligation owed the United States, Russia’s conduct raises serious concerns about its adherence to OSCC Decisions 2/15 and 2/09. There is a reasonable basis to conclude that Russia’s refusal to allow Ukraine to overfly Russia without prepayment could be the basis for a violation determination on the part of Ukraine.
CONDUCT GIVING RISE TO COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
In January 2015, the OSCC decided on the annual distribution of observation flight quotas for 2015. The OSCC’s decision allotted six quotas to Ukraine for observation flights over Russia – some to be flown by Ukraine solo, and some to be flown in partnership with other States Parties. On February 9, Ukraine notified Russia via Format 12 notification that it intended to conduct an observation flight over its territory. The following day, Russia responded via Format 13 notification, citing a prior Format 35 notification to Ukraine with instructions for pre-payment and bank routing information. Russia made clear in subsequent statements, including at a January 2015 OSCC Plenary session, that it would not allow Ukraine to conduct a solo observation flight over its territory unless Ukraine paid for the flight in advance. As a result of Ukraine’s refusal to pay in advance, Ukraine was unable to conduct any solo flights over Russian territory during 2015.
ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE CONCERNS
OSCC Decision 2/09, Section I, Paragraph 1 provides that, unless otherwise specified in the Decision or agreed to by the States Parties, “an observing Party using its own observation aircraft or an observation aircraft designated by a third Party shall reimburse the observed Party” for certain costs, including fuel, oil, oxygen, de-icing fluid, and ground and technical servicing. Paragraph six of the Decision specifies certain other costs, including costs related to meals and accommodation of the observing Party’s personnel, which the observing Party shall reimburse “in accordance with the mechanism set forth in this Decision.”
The mechanism for such reimbursement is described in Section V of Decision 2/09. As provided in Paragraph 9, “[n]o later than 30 days after completion of an observation flight the observed Party shall transmit an invoice to the observing Party clearly itemizing the costs incurred during that observation flight ….” Paragraph 10 provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed, at the end of each calendar year the States Parties will exchange requests for payment in EUR or US dollars.” Following a review of these requests, “any State Party that is in debt to any other State Party shall pay its debt in EUR or US dollars to that State Party no later than 1 March of the following year – unless the debt is still under discussion.”
The pre-payment procedures imposed by Russia in its Format 13 and Format 35 notifications appear to be plainly inconsistent with the reimbursement procedures prescribed by Decision 2/09. Accordingly, it could reasonably be argued that Ukraine had no obligation to comply with the Russian procedures, and Russia had no basis to condition Ukraine’s ability to conduct observation flights over Russian territory upon Ukraine’s submission to the pre-payment procedures.
EFFORTS TO RESOLVE COMPLIANCE CONCERNSHere is the rebuttal from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which isn't easy to find using Google unless you know exactly what you're looking for) The source is here or here. Also of note, this is an unofficial translation, copied from their official web site.
During 2015, the United States, Ukraine, and several other like-minded States Parties have objected to this practice during meetings of the OSCC and during the 3rd Review Conference in June. To date, these efforts have not resolved this issue, and Russia continues to insist Ukraine prepay for its solo flights. Accordingly, to avoid delaying adoption of the 2016 quota allocation, Ukraine did not bid on any solo flights over Russia, instead opting only to conduct flights with partners. The United States will continue to support Ukraine in its effort to resolve this issue at the OSCC.
15 April 2016 19:13
Comment by the Information and Press Department of the MFA of Russia on the US Department of State 2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
752-15-04-2016
On April 12, the US Department of State published its annual Report to the Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments in 2015. Same as before, Washington did not limit itself to presenting its own “exemplary” compliance with all its treaty obligations but acted also as a “mentor” who deemed itself entitled to assess the corresponding “progress” of other States.If you actually read all that I'm pretty impressed, or maybe I should say surprised!
Even a quick analysis of the Report shows that it can hardly be taken as a serious document that qualifies for portraying the real situation in arms control and non-proliferation.
Without taking the trouble to provide any evidence, the US Department of State actually slid into unsubstantiated accusations against Russia. The assessments provided in the report are blatantly judgmental, biased and prejudiced. They are comprised of an extravagant combination of speculations, exaggerations, assumptions as well as blatantly false messages and deliberately distorted facts. The obvious goal is to create a negative image of Russia in the hope that few readers will make an effort to analyze the details of the unsupported examples of Russia’s alleged “violations”. When compared to the real state of affairs, the US Department of State “assessments”, unfortunately, bring about thoughts about these regrettable “expert evaluation.”
For the third year in a row, the Report renders absolutely unfounded accusations of Russia supposedly violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The Report states that Russia produces and tests ground‑launched cruise missiles with a range of 500 km to 5,500 km and their associated launchers. According to all indications the American side does not have any objective evidence neither has it any weighty arguments to substantiate these allegations made against Russia. Washington deliberately creates a negative information backdrop for the INF Treaty in an attempt to discredit Russia.
Whereas the following Russian concerns are disregarded,
(1) The United States continues its tests in the interests of missile defense using target missiles which have characteristics similar to those of intermediate- and shorter-range ballistic missiles (these tests are used, inter alia, to further improve the key elements of Treaty-prohibited missile systems);
(2) The United States continues to increase production and use of heavy attack UAVs that clearly fall under the INF Treaty definition of ground‑launched cruise missiles;
(It should be noted that we have been pointing to our American colleagues at these two obvious violations of the INF Treaty by the United States for as long as a decade and a half. There has not been so far any constructive feedback.)
(3) A relatively new and rather serious violation of the INF Treaty was the deployment in Europe of the Mk 41 systems capable of launching Tomahawk intermediate-range cruise missiles. These vertical launch systems are being installed today at the Deveselu missile defense base in Romania, and the construction of a similar facility in Poland is next in turn.
What stands out are the persisting statements of Pentagon authorities on thrashing out options of military response, up to eventual deployment of Treaty-prohibited intermediate- and shorter-range missiles close to the Russian borders. This exposes a real (coming from Pentagon) rather than imaginary (coming from Russia) threat of undermining the INF regime, which can have unpredictable consequences for Europe and for the international community as a whole.
We call upon the United States to stop throwing out innuendoes against Russia and to focus instead on complying with its own INF obligations.
Washington’s approach to compliance with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is still of great concern. The US and its non-nuclear NATO allies continue their nuclear skill training as part of the so-called “nuclear sharing”. This is a serious violation of Articles I and II of the NPT.
Instead of making publicity statements on the US commitment to making further steps in nuclear disarmament, it would be reasonable first to bring back all American non-strategic nuclear weapons to the national territory (as Russia did about a quarter-century ago), introduce a ban on their deployment outside the national territory, eliminate all facilities necessary to redeploy urgently the US nuclear weapons in Europe, and certainly abandon any nuclear exercises (drills) for the personnel of the armed forces from non-nuclear NATO States.
It is seriously alarming that, as part of its unprecedented nuclear arsenal modernization programme, the US is planning to deploy in Europe new nuclear aerial bombs of lower yield but higher precision. This is a very dangerous project that can significantly lower the “threshold” of nuclear weapons use when US nuclear bombs in Europe could turn into “battlefield weapons”. It is important to remember that Moscow and Washington turned down this option 25 years ago. Today, the US seems keen to recover its previous irresponsible practice of balancing on the brink of nuclear war.
At the 2015 NPT Review Conference the US along with the UK and Canada blocked the concluding document of the Conference, thus demonstrating that strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime was not on their priority list. This is particularly unfortunate, considering that the US is a depositary state for the NPT, and, furthermore, aspires to become a global non-proliferation leader.
Washington’s declared commitment to stronger non-proliferation regime is also obviously contradicted by its inconsistent position on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
As far as in the mid-1990s President Bill Clinton declared the CTBT the “No.1 priority” for the US. Since then, the Americans have made numerous statements on their intention to ratify the CTBT and pursue its early entry into force. President Obama also made promises to the effect but has failed to make any practical steps in this direction so far.
This year marks twenty years since the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was open for signature. The Treaty’s destiny still lies in hands of those eight Member States listed in Annex 2 whose ratification is required for its entry into force.
Washington’s irresponsible position in terms of CTBT ratification is the main obstacle toward making the Treaty an effective international legal instrument. Other countries also act looking out for Washington. Therefore, the prospects that the CTBT will enter into force are not within view.
The indecent intention of the US Department of State to contest the entirety of Russia’s announcement on Article III of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and thus to challenge the adequacy and deserved authority of the OPCW as the most efficient and successful global structure for disarmament and WMD nonproliferation never fails to amaze. However, the OPCW has no claims against Russia, unlike Washington.
In turn, we would like to advise our US counterparts to abandon their “double standards” in the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors in the Middle East. Washington itself should comply with its obligations under UNSC Resolutions 2118, 2209 and 2235, and share with the Security Council the evidence of crimes committed by ISIS and other terrorist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, which the US forces obtained in 2015-2016 directly at the sites where the extremists had used toxic agents.
Only the politicization and interest in propaganda campaign against Russia can explicate the content of the section that “analyzes” Russia’s compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC). It is illustrative that this year only Russia was chosen as a target of vain insinuations and figments in this area. It fits well within the style of information warfare unleashed against Russia, when, as the saying goes, no holds barred. The subsequent attempts to denigrate Russia are aimed at distracting attention from the abominable role that the US plays within the BWC context.
The facts on the ground are that the US itself seriously damaged the BWC regime by ruining at its sole discretion the long-lasting multilateral talks aimed at elaborating the additional Protocol to the BWC, which were approaching to an end. According to the then-drafted Protocol the microbiological activity of the States Parties would have been subject to on-site inspections by an independent authority - the Technical Secretariat. Having derailed the Protocol, the US now complains of having apparently no possibility to verify the compliance with the BWC. It has nobody to blame but itself for this, including for the fact that it has been blocking any constructive attempts to step up a substantive work within the framework of BWC since 2001.
Against this background, the international community is particularly concerned about the Pentagon’s dangerous microbiological activities. We shall give only two most alarming examples.
First, the years long mailing of live anthrax spores by the US Department of Defense all over the world. Far from being accidental, this mailing occurred on 195 occasions and reached 12 States all over the world. As a result, not only nescient US citizens but also populations in other countries were exposed to a fatal danger of contamination. Until now, the scale of these violations has not been established, including the real purpose of the US Defense Department’s “manufacturing sites” where spores have been developed and the true objectives of their forwarding to the US military facilities overseas.
Second, the continuous expansion of overseas military biological infrastructure of the US Defense Department. The corresponding facilities have sprung up in many countries, and in recent years they are being created increasingly closer to the Russian borders. There is no question of the “humanitarian orientation” of work of such microbiologists and doctors in uniform, who deal with highly contagious disease agents, but one can only guess as to the real subject of their activity because the latter is fully classified. For example, the US Department of Defense has built a high-level biological isolation laboratory in the village of Alekseyevka near Tbilisi to be used for its own, behind-the-scene purposes. It was declared for form’s sake that the facility was handed over to Georgia while a US Army medical research unit deployed there was just a “tenant.”
While accusing developing countries of a lack of progress in implementing the BWC at the national level, including by approving relevant legislation, the US consciously and consistently keeps its own laws that run counter to its international commitments. These include, in particular, the reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol with regard to the right to use chemical or toxin weapons and the US President’s Executive Order 11850 that enables the US armed forces to use “nonlethal” chemical and toxin weapons as warfare agents. Particularly flagrant is the implementation of the 2001 Patriot Act that actually endorses the development of biological weapons with consent of the US Government. In our opinion, the “biological” section of this document must be repealed immediately.
It is not for the first year that the Report’s section dedicated to the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) reproduces a set of cut-and -dried allegations accusing Russia of non-compliance with Treaty. We have repeatedly provided exhaustive replies to such allegations in the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) and in our responses to previous State Department’s reports of this kind.
With regard to Russia restricting the use of its airspace, we reiterate that the altitude limitation for aircraft flying over Moscow and Chechen prohibited areas are due to flight safety requirements (given the absence of continuous radar monitoring at lower altitudes).
The limits of the maximum flying distance over the Kaliningrad Oblast were introduced pursuant to the relevant OST provisions and OSCC decision. Such procedure provides for the same efficiency of observation as during flights over the rest of the territory of the Russian Federation and over the territories of adjacent States (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia).
The restrictions for Open Skies flights near the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been introduced in accordance with the Treaty that states that observation flights shall be allowed up to ten kilometers from the border with an adjacent State that is not a State Party. The independent States of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not Parties to the OST.
Another US claim concerns Russia’s alleged refusal to ensure priority status for Open Skies flights. However, under the Treaty, observation flights shall take priority over any regular air traffic, that is, regular commercial flights.
Now we would like to dwell on what the authors of the US Report conceal, i.e. violations of the Open Skies Treaty by the United States and its NATO allies.
For 12 years of the operation of the Treaty the United States has been disregarding its provisions on providing special procedures for observation of US island territories and possessions. Therefore, a considerable portion of the US territory has been inaccessible for observation for a long time in gross violation of the fundamentals of the Treaty. Washington did not make advances to accommodate Russian requests till the end of 2015.
The United States practically closed its territory for observation by Russian AN‑30B aircraft with digital sensors in violation of the States Parties’ right to conduct observation flights. At the same time, Washington launched a media campaign blowing up an argument on the allegedly emerging threat to the US national security in case of flights being conducted by the Russian Open Skies aircraft with digital sensors onboard. However, it is admitted in the Report that the US itself initiated the transition to digital technologies within the OST.
The United States acted demonstratively when supporting Georgia’s decision, which was destructive for the fundamentals of the Treaty, to cease the implementation of its OST obligations with regard to Russia and thus set up a precedent of selective implementation of this multilateral document. By the way, although promised, the United States has not secured since 2008 the payment of Georgia’s debt due for their joint observation flight over the Russian territory.
Having assumed to itself the right to pass judgments on the acts of other States, the American side persistently justifies the violations of the Treaty obligations by its NATO allies. Thus instead of condemning Turkey’s closure to observation of a considerable portion of its south-eastern territories in contradiction to the very basics of the Treaty, Washington cynically stated that it was satisfied with the way Turkey complied with the Treaty. It appears that the policy of double standards has long become the norm for our American colleagues.
As for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), there is no sense to come back to this issue. It should be reminded that the United States itself and its NATO allies created conditions that undermined the viability of the CFE Treaty and made inevitable its suspension by Russia in 2007. Since then, the erosion and weakening of the conventional arms control regime in Europe have only aggravated.
Moreover, the United States and NATO have opted for a policy of “deterring” Russia and changing the balance of forces on the European continent in their favour by expanding the alliance and moving its military infrastructure further east and, most recently, by deploying their troops in close proximity to the Russian borders.
We are convinced that the prospects for elaborating a new conventional arms control regime in Europe based on the principles of equal and indivisible security and the balance of rights and obligations of the parties should be considered in conjunction with NATO’s renouncing from strengthening its military “deterrence” measures against Russia and thereby restoring an adequate level of trust and normal relations with the Russian Federation, including in military cooperation.
These past few years, the US Department of State’s reports routinely accuse Russia of “selective implementation” and “insufficient transparency” with regard to the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence and Security-Building Measures. It should be stated, however, that neither “unusual or unscheduled military activities” nor exceeding thresholds of notified armed forces activities have been registered in the course of the three inspections conducted by Ukraine, the Netherlands and Turkey in the Southern Military District in the regions bordering Ukraine. Kiev’s attempts to blame Russia of non-compliance with certain provisions of the Vienna Document were not supported by any serious arguments, to which we pointed in our replies to the Ukrainian side.
By the way, Kiev did not implement its own commitments under the Vienna Document with regard to the military activities of its armed forces in Donbass both in 2014 and 2015. But the Report of the US State Department has omitted to mention this.
In 2015, Russia voluntarily sent four notifications to the OSCE participating States, including the United States, citing the detailed parameters of unscheduled military and aviation inspections that were conducted in several military districts. Of course, these notifications included the forces that fall within the provisions of the Vienna Document.
As for reproaching Russia for non-provision of information on military bases of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation located in the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we note that these sovereign States are not participants to the OSCE and are, therefore, not included in the zone of confidence-building measures, as it is defined by the Vienna Document 2011. The US experts who drafted this section of the State Department’s Report are certainly well aware of this. They also know for sure that Russia submits this information in line with another OSCE instrument, the Global Exchange of Military Information. By the way, Turkey, a US ally, is doing the same with regard to its forces in Northern Cyprus. This does not provoke any objections in Washington.
A few words about the Russian BRM-1K armoured vehicle mentioned in the US Report (certainly reproaching Russia for concealing this data). In terms of its technical specifications, this vehicle does not fit into any military equipment category on which information is to be submitted under the Vienna Document 2011. It is revealing that the United States which has failed to resolve this issue for many years within the CFE Treaty is now trying “to drag” it into the VD-2011.
It appears that the authors of the Report, who have not found any specific provisions that would allow them to really “catch” Russia, are trying groundlessly to accuse it of violating the principle of non-use of force or threat of force with regard to Ukraine. No evidence has been provided. At the same time, they “humbly” keep quiet about numerous real violations of that principle by the United States itself.
We note that the platform of the Vienna Document is used by Washington to solve political tasks. For example, in 2015, the United States in their requests for inspections as part of its bilateral agreements with Ukraine deliberately included the territory of Crimea in the areas to be inspected. This was done to create a conflict situation and to launch another spiral of discussions in the OSCE. Naturally, we provided a well‑considered and legally sound reply to such “endeavors.”
During an inspection on the territory of Bulgaria the Russian inspection team was taken to a military camp where the US armed forces units were located. Russian inspectors discovered several dozen tanks, armoured vehicles and howitzers, numerous motor vehicles, engineer and other equipment that belonged to the US Marine Corps units and were not declared at the briefing. During the inspection in the military camp, the inspection team was not allowed to leave its vehicle. A similar situation took place during an inspection of a US Army unit located in Spain. This means that improper implementation by Washington of the Vienna Document is not one-of-a-kind fact.
Our review of the State Department’s Report leads to disappointing conclusions. Instead of engaging into a consistent thorough work to settle the existing divergences within the appropriate formats and with the participation of all interested States, the United States still prefers to repeat with certain variations year after year the politically motivated and lopsided assessments of implementation of provisions of arms control treaties and agreements by other States, without taking the trouble to search for arguments and facts.
Russia stands for a civilized, substantive and constructive discussion at the negotiating table of issues arising during the implementation by States of their obligations in the area of arms control and non-proliferation.
We call our American colleagues for engaging in such a work.
"Russia continues not to meet its treaty obligations to allow effective observation of its entire territory, raising serious compliance concerns under Article VI and VIII of the OST and OSCC Decision 3/04." -2016 Report, US State Department"its entire territory" is an interesting term to use since Russia's exact borders differ depending on who you ask.
"effective observation" is another interesting choice of words, since it is subjective.
"Specifically, Russia has:I've numbered these myself to keep track point by point.
(1) enforced a “maximum flight distance” of 500 kilometers for all flights over Kaliningrad since 2014;
(2) refused access in a ten-kilometer corridor along its border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2010;
(3a) refused access in the Moscow region below 3,600 meters altitude in an area 39 kilometers by 31 kilometers, identified by Russian Air Traffic Control as UUP-53 since 2005,
(3b) and below 5,100 meters altitude over Chechnya and nearby areas of southwestern Russia since 2002;
(4) and refused to provide air traffic control facilitation including by improperly invoking force majeure, for certain OST flights since 2011."
US Objection #1)
Are you familiar with Kaliningrad? Probably not. Here's a picture I swiped from WikipediaRussia's Kaliningrad District ( the tiny red area ) |
I can think of no reason the US or any signatory nation wouldn't be able to do two, three, four - as many overflights as they would like to accomplish their objectives over Kaliningrad. The US (above) claim that would be unacceptable, and 500km is insufficient. Really?
Kaliningrad is ~15,100 km2, which is half the size of Vancouver Island, or three times larger than Prince Edward Island, or about the same size as Connecticut. Scribbling a fictitious 500km flight plan of my own over Kaliningrad looks to me like it would cover quite a bit of territory, zig zagging back and forth over the area.
Since no provision for a sub-limit on the distance of an overflight over Kaliningrad is in the Open Skies Treaty, this unilateral limit imposed by the Russians *does* contravene the treaty. However, I don't personally see this as a major problem, and I don't think it contravenes the spirit of the agreement either. This should be settled by the OSCC by reducing the distance that is allowed when flying over Kaliningrad.
US Objection #2)
"Refused access in a ten-kilometer corridor along its border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 2010"If off the top of your head you're familiar with the contested borders of Russia and Georgia I'm going to throw out a wild guess you're ahead of the vast majority of the world's people, so here's another Wikipedia-snatched image for those of us who don't know the Geopolitics of Georgia-Russian relations.
Source: Wikipedia |
US Objection #3a)
"refused access in the Moscow region below 3,600 meters altitude in an area 39 kilometers by 31 kilometers, identified by Russian Air Traffic Control as UUP-53 since 2005."I can't figure out why I can't find more information on UUP-53, but it is a restricted piece of airspace over Moscow, restricted to all flights, and the Russians insist overflights stay above 3600m (11811 feet) to photograph. Interestingly in the 2016 compliance report they have removed the statement that the United States *can* photograph UUP-53 at a higher altitude with an alternate panoramic camera, but other state parties don't have that camera in their sensor package (like Canada and the camera pod we use and share with other countries)
"Although the United States is able to obtain Treaty-allowed resolution imagery of the territory under UUP-53 airspace using its higher-altitude KA-91C panoramic cameras, weather permitting, its KS-87E framing camera is unable to achieve the Treaty-allowed resolution of 30 centimeters when operated above 3,600 meters. When flying on partner aircraft, the United States is unable to obtain Treaty-allowed resolution imagery within UUP-53." -2014 Report, US State DepartmentIt is unclear to me why the framing camera is preferred over the panoramic camera, or if it is at all, but indeed there is no provision in the Open Skies treaty that would allow the Russians to impose a height restriction for an extended period over part of Moscow. The Russians claim this is due to flight safety, as they do not have sufficient radar coverage at low altitudes in that area. This reasoning seems rather sketchy. Is this against the spirit of the agreement? Maybe. I don't think it's a major issue, but I'm sure that could be argued.
US Objection #3b)
"...and below 5,100 meters altitude over Chechnya and nearby areas of southwestern Russia since 2002"I'm not sure what other area in Southwest Russia this would be in reference to, but Chechnya is still a hot-spot, and the Russians claim for flight safety reasons flights below 5,100 meters are not allowed. As I understanding it, the purpose of the Open Skies Treaty is to ensure signatory state parties are not amassing weapons or troops on the border with other nations, or otherwise making preparations to go to war with their neighbours, or other countries. Chechnya is a district of Russia that has had insurrections that have been put down forcefully by the Russian military, and is not suspected (that I've heard) of being a location where the Russians would be amassing an army to take over Georgia, for example, or any other area. The only benefit of photographing this area is to see what military deployments the Russians have within the territory of Chechnya, and I'm not sure what the ultimate purpose of that would be. Russia is not banning flights over Chechnya, but mandating the flights be higher. It is effectively reducing the resolution of the imagery that can be taken; like making someone stand too far back when taking a portrait/bust picture. Is this a sneaky way for the Russians to block the Americans from photographing Chechnya at a 30cm resolution? It would be extremely sloppy of them to do so. 30cm imagery is available from US-based commercial satellite imagery providers, and if the US State Department was really concerned about the goings on in Chechnya, they could request the information from their own National Reconnaissance Office spy satellites which have cameras in space even more capable than 30 cm resolution. However, if the Americans did use those spy satellites, they would be unable to share the imagery with their other signatory parties to the Open Skies treaty, due to the classification of the imagery. So why does the United States want to photograph Chechnya? Of course, the treaty doesn't require an explanation, and I doubt they would provide one.
US Objection #4)
"refused to provide air traffic control facilitation including by improperly invoking force majeure, for certain OST flights since 2011."On day 1 of an overflight mission, even before the flight starts, the party doing the overflight tables a flight plan. That flight plan is negotiated, agreed upon, and then executed. Unless something comes up that endangers the plane, like a terrible storm, or volcanic eruption, the flight plan is supposed to be executed. The Russians have called a "force majeure" during certain overflights using the excuse that it was due to a VVIP being present, on the ground, during the overflight of an area. This seems to be an improper use of the term, since a convoy or whatever circumstance is going on, on the ground, would be a man-made, not a natural environmental hazard, and probably shouldn't have been used to divert the overflight. Was this a ruse only because the Russians didn't want something photographed that they had not noticed on the flight plan originally? Quite possibly. Is this a reason to tear up the agreement or sanction Russia? I don't think so. The United States plays their own games, and Russia is playing theirs.
My view of this is American objections to Russian "restrictions" are being overblown by high-ranking military members and congress to achieve political gain, and quite disingenuously, since they have the technology and satellite imagery at their disposal to see everything, anywhere, at any time.
I do not believe there are many, or potentially any, military movements in the world that some level of the American Military is unaware of. Clearly these issues need to be brought up with the OSCC, but the spin and vilification of Russian actions by elements of the American government isn't constructive, and only serves their political gain, rather than a rational discussion.
National Reconassance Office emblem for NROL-39 "Nothing is Beyond Our Reach" ref: https://patriotpost.us/posts/22152 |
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