Showing posts with label ELINT. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ELINT. Show all posts

July 05, 2016

Why are the Russians intercepting USAF planes over International Waters?

Boeing RC-135W Rivet Joint - 62-4131 (same as was intercepted)
Photo taken: October 25, 2015 - Mildenhall Air Force Base
Photo Credit: Simon Mortimer / JetPhotos.net
Blair Gertz's article on aggressive Russian posturing should make people wonder, what the hell are they doing?  There has been little (no) editorials written (that I've seen) about what would make Russia harass the US Air Force or US Navy in or above international waters.  Where are "International Waters" anyway?
"Territorial waters, or a territorial sea, as defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, is a belt of coastal waters extending at most 12 nautical miles (22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal state." -Wikipedia
On April 14th 2016 an RC-135W, call sign HOWL77, registration 62-4131, (reportedly) had its transponder on, and was met by at least one Su-27 over the Baltic Sea.  I presume the plane was near, and clearly targeting, Kaliningrad Oblast with it's sensor suite, or was on a flight path that made the Russian expect they would be.  After all, why else would you fly a spy plane in the Baltic?  As a reaction, the RuAF sent a fighter or two to intercept and shoo away the Americans.

Kaliningrad Oblast, is part of Russia, although it does not have a land bridge to Russia.  Kaliningrad Oblast extends about 250 km inland; I've marked 22 km on the map below so the distance can be appreciated.  That doesn't look very far, because it's not.


































Consider this; due to the curvature of the earth, the higher up you are, the farther you can see before the horizon limits your view.  If you had a 100 Meter tower, you'd be able to see ~35 km from the top of that tower to the horizon.  If you had two 100 Meter towers, you could see between the tops of the towers ~70 km away from each other.  This is how terrestrial microwave repeaters work; you take two towers, put directional antennas (dishes) on them that point at each other, and you can beam a signal ~70km away.  If you keep putting towers up in a line, you get a trans-continental microwave network like the one built across Canada in 1959... but that's another topic.

So what are the planes the US are flying in "International Waters"?  The RC-135, part of the 95th Reconnaissance Squadron flying out of RAF Mildenhall, England, has been hitting the news, but I wonder if the E-8C JSTARS flying out of  Geilenkirchen NATO Air Force Base in Germany are also flying around.
"The RC-135 Rivet Joint is an Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) collecting reconnaissance aircraft that has the ability to detect, locate and identify emitting mobile targets with its Automatic Emitter Location System (AELS)" - US Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies (link)
"The E-8C JSTARS aircraft is a battle surveillance platform that employs its on-board AN/APY-3 system to detect and track mobile ground forces. The AN/APY-3 is a SideLooking Airborne Radar (SLAR) that incorporates SAR and MTI capabilities. Its MTI/Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) capability detects, locates, and classifies slow moving vehicles. The MTI technique that is used allows differentiation between wheeled and tracked vehicles. The MTI/Sector Search (SS) mode provides enhanced image resolution and attack guidance. Other operating modes may include an enhanced SAR for ‘super’ resolution imagery and an inverse SAR for target recognition" - US Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies (link)
Both of these quotes are from the year 2000; it's hard to find information on reconnaissance aircraft for some reason.

The RC-135 has a ceiling of 50,000 ft according to the US Air Force.  Even at 40,000 ft, the horizon would be 715 km away; making Kaliningrad Oblast, all of it, in full view if you looked out the window of the plane.  Back in the Cold War, the U2 spy plane flew over Russia with downward facing wet film cameras; that was the technology of the time.  The U2 was also famously shot down over the Soviet Union in 1960; it was clearly in the Soviet's right to do so, as it was over their territory.  But what if you flew high, and angled the camera diagonally, staying over international waters?  You could achieve almost the same effect, but get better resolution than a satellite flying high over the objective, without the distortion of the atmosphere, and with the moral high ground that you're not flying over the sovereign territory of the country you're spying on; you're over "international waters".

In 1991 during the Gulf War, the E-8C's AN/APY-7 radar could track 600 targets and cover 50,000 km2, at a range of 250 km in a 120 degree field of view.  I'm going to guess they've improved the technology since 1991, so consider that the worst it could do. (data based on "Activity-Based Intelligence: Principles and Applications" by Patrick Biltgen, Stephen Ryan)  The capabilities of the system continue to improve.

The RC-135 is a SIGINT/ELINT platform fitted with all sorts of antennas to be able to listen to, and tell what direction any electronic emission is coming from.  Listening to everything transmitting wirelessly in all of Kaliningrad would be the objective of flying near Kaliningrad, I'd think.  As a reconnaissance aircraft that's spying (diagonally) at their territory, I'm not very surprised the Russian Air Force is playing mind games with the US Air Force and "buzzing" them with fighter jets.

How about the Russians?  Aren't they flying near the US with their bombers and long range reconnaissance planes?

Why yes they are, once or twice a month, but the closest they've come in decades is 39 miles from the California coast, on July 4th 2015, off the coast of California, over International Waters (there's that term again...).

"two U.S. F-15 jets intercepted the Russian bombers on July 4 as they flew as close as 39 miles from the coast of Mendocino County, north of San Francisco." -Blair Gertz, Washington Free Beacon

39mi is 63km, which is almost three times farther as the RC-135 was from Kaliningrad in April.

Why is it when empty Russian bombers are antagonizing the Americans off the coast it's war games, and when the US is antagonizing the Russians off their coast with bleeding edge spy planes, listening to, and exploiting emissions, it's just a little good fun?

The language of the outrage used in US vs Russian press releases, and biased news reports, needs to be critically studied constantly in order to see through the spin.

June 12, 2016

Revisiting the 2014 Nikolay Chiker (Николай Чикер) Trans-Atlantic Tour

Nikolay Chiker - ShipSpotting.com - Cees Bustraan
Photo Taken 2014.03.03
Remember back in the spring of 2014 there was a Russian "Spy Ship", a Russian Navy AGI, the Viktor Leonov (Виктор Леонов), floating off the East coast of the USA for weeks, and a Russian Navy SAR/Salvage/Tug, Nikolay Chiker (Николай Чикер), in the same area, at the same time, zig-zagging around?

If you don't, here is Bill Gertz's article about the Russian Spy Ship and Tug.  Here are my previous posts on the topic too.

I wanted to fill in the blanks on the map I had made previously with the *complete* trip the Nikolay Chiker made using historical data from a commercial AIS provider... but it would cost hundreds of Euros to get what I was looking for, so I decided against it.  Without a corporate financier, it seemed a little extravagant.  So, the map remained cobbled together with whatever free copy & pasted coordinates I could find at the time, and Tom's coordinates that he was tweeting from the moorse code they were sending back home over HF.  It did the job, at the time.

Open Source Map of the Nikolay Chiker's Movements in 2014


Seven months ago I realised the Terrestrial Automatic Identification System (AIS-T) receivers along the US Coast are operated by the US Coast Guard, so I asked the Coast Guard for a copy of their historical AIS data of the Nikolay Chiker's positions (IMO: 8613334 / MMSI: 273531629) from March 01, 2014 to May 13, 2014; when I knew it should have been near American waters in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, and more importantly, within range of US Coast Guard AIS-T receivers.  I submitted my FOIA request in November of 2015, and received the information in June of 2016.  I guess I can't complain regarding how long it took; I didn't pay anything for the information, and I'm even a foreign national!  I'd like to give a big thank you to the folks at the US Coast Guard for providing the information, it was very much appreciated.

New Map of Nikolay Chiker locations, as logged by the US Coast Guard via AIS-T

AIS Data Courtesy of the United States Coast Guard

What are we looking at here?

The AIS transponder on the Nikolay Chiker beacons to anyone who's listening.  When she is close enough to shore, US Coast Guard (AIS-T) shore-based receivers pick up her location, speed, heading, etc... Click on the red dots to get the information relayed via AIS at that location.  Some dotted lines fade out as the ship edges out of range of the shore-based receivers.  The ship can also turn off it's transponder at any time, but I'm unclear if regulations or conventions restrict when they can do so.  Please note, there are no timestamps on the locations; I didn't figure out how to preserve the timestamps from the US Coast Guard FOIA I filed.

What don't we see?

We don't see any satellite, aerial, sub-surface, Coast Guard ship-based, gypsy-with-a-crystal-ball, sonar, or radar data.  I mention this because there are a lot of gaps in the data, and I don't want to give the impression the ship was hiding at all - this is not a comprehensive view of what the US Coast Guard and US Navy can "see" and are situationally aware of.  This is just one unclassified public solution used in maritime shipping globally, where unclassified data meets classified operational information.  Also worth mentioning is that all of this information is served up by an AIS beacon, which the Captain of the Nikolay Chiker knows is broadcasting for all to see.  Keep in mind we don't see the position of the Viktor Leonov AGI, but we know from eyewitness accounts that the Viktor Leonov and Nikolay Chiker were very near each other on March 21st 2014, just outside US waters, right near Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay.

Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay is home to two Ohio-Class SSGNs, six Ohio-Class SSBN submarines, has a stockpile of 107 Nuclear SLBMs, and I suspect even more warheads.  These submarines were initially commissioned between 1979 and 1994, and are living reminders of the Cold War.  They are still in use, have been extensively refitted, and their mission often consists of lurking in the depths of the ocean, trying to stay undetected by the Russian Navy.


Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay

Behaviour

Clicking through the data, you'll see the Nikolay Chiker laid anchor at least a couple of times off the coast near King's Bay, then Daytona Beach seemed to attract her attention, and eventually Cape Canaveral where there was a SpaceX launch taking place.  If any ship was just "passing through" it would be unusual for it to lay anchor at those locations, I'd think.  No commercial shipping would normally stop in those locations, none of them are particularly attractive to stop and stay for the night (or day).  We are, unfortunately, only seeing half of the scenario - the Viktor Leonov AGI was also off the coast, and if it was leading the way, the Nikolay Chiker could have just been killing time.  A Naval AGI asset's whole purpose is to collect ELINT / COMINT (SIGINT) on a target.  What targets were they listening to?  Civilian comms infrastructure or military comms?  Were they just getting samples of data from each location along the coast, or listening for one thing the whole way?


Speed

Please notice what speed the Nikolay Chiker was travelling while examining her positions on the map.  I speculate when she is travelling alone she travels at full speed; 12-14Kts.  When she is with the Viktor Leonov, I believe she limits her speed to the same as the Leonov; a slower ~8-9Kts.  Further, I can't explain why she would trawl at 3-6Kts, unless she was towing a sensor array, or something similar.  Unfortunately I have a limited data set, but hopefully over time I can compile more examples of Russian Navy Auxiliary ships doing strange loitering off the East Coast of North America, and draw further conclusions.

Conclusions?

I can't draw any conclusions from this data, but I can throw out more speculation.
  • It's likely the Nikolay Chiker's mission was multi-faceted.  I would be surprised if they crossed the Atlantic from the Mediterranean solely in case the Viktor Leonov had engine trouble and needed a tow.  While that is part of Russian Navy doctrine (always travel with a tug), I wouldn't think having a tug deployed and travelling in circles while they waited for an emergency wouldn be an efficient use of resources.
  • The Nikolay Chiker has a moon pool (to allow diving from the inside/bottom of the ship) and decompression chambers that allow for deep water operations.  This is a "special set of skills" that not many ships have, and would lend itself to covert underwater operations.
  • I suspect the Nikolay Chiker was surveying the ocean's bottom for ASW sensors and undocumented military underwater cables, but I have no way to prove that without knowing where the sensors and cables are - and their locations are... you guessed it.. Secret.
  • The Nikolay Chiker has several extremely strong winches and cranes, to facilitate both towing and Search and Rescue operations.  Those same features could be used to move/lift/drag objects on the ocean's floor, or lift them to the surface. 
  • On the old map you'll notice that several long straight lines were sailed, back and forth, in the Caribbean.  These are similar to the back and forth that was done off the coast of Georgia.  But what were they doing?  I remember someone called it "loitering", but it seems very purposeful to me, not just random paths.
  • While I try to discern what military purpose these paths on the map might allude to, I also realize that there may be human factors, that are less military or professional, that could be at play.  Maybe the Captain of the Nikolay Chiker was following some wales, so he could take pictures of them?  Maybe the Nikolay Chiker and Viktor Leonov met at sea not for replenishment operations, but to have a long promised poker game?  Maybe the Nikolay Chiker made a bee line from the Caribbean to King's Bay at a high rate of speed to get out of the way of an approaching storm?  By only seeing the AIS data from the Nikolay Chiker, without context, and without the path of the Viktor Leonov, I do admit any conclusions I draw will be wild speculation.
So, if you have any ideas what they were up to, and have any additional information, please let me know.


Parade Standard of the U.S. Coast Guard
(Wikipedia)

Credit

  • I'd like to thank the United States Coast Guard, who don't get sufficient credit in this age of international military interventions.  They do great work, at home.
  • I'd like to thank Andre van den Berg for his help; Andre is an expert in the field of AIS, a consultant, and the CEO of Maritec.

CNN, February ~27th, 2014